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A

NATION OF POLICYHOLDERS: GOVERNMENTAL AND
MARKET FAILURE IN FLOOD INSURANCE
Adam F. Scales1

"If there's a dime lying somewhere along the Gulf Coast of Mississippi,
there's an insurance company that's gonna bend down to pick it up."2
I.

INTRODUCTION

Unfortunately, Attorney General Hood's colorful observation has
proven untrue. Hurricane Katrina's direct physical toll has been estimated
to exceed $200 billion, only a fraction of which is recoverable under existing insurance law.3 As many policyholders and citizens have realized,
insurance is something we tend to think about only after a disaster. Indeed, this oversight is a central explanation for why the system for allocating flood losses in the United States has failed.
Now that Katrina's waters have receded, it is time to reconcile insurance law and policy to reality: Catastrophic losses create interdependencies
among public and private actors that must be managed rather than
avoided. Our current systems for preventing, mitigating, and allocating
these losses are fractured, diffuse, and maddeningly counterproductive. No
1. Associate Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University. I am grateful to Tom Baker,
Peter Siegelman, Jeff Stempel, and David Reiss for their comments on drafts as well as suggestions for
this research. Faculty workshops at Washington and Lee and the University of Connecticut proved
invaluable as well. This project was funded by the Frances Lewis Law Center at Washington and Lee
University School of Law, and warmly offered a home in this Symposium to which it contributes a small
yet distinct voice.
Subsequent to the presentation and drafting of this Article, I was retained as a consultant by counsel representing policyholders in part of the Katrina insurance litigation. My views, long predating that
engagement, are a matter of public record. Adam Scales, How Will Homeowners Insurance Litigation
After Katrina Play Out?, FINDLAw, Sept. 19, 2005, http:I/writ.news.findlaw.comlcommentary/20050919
scales.html; Adam Scales, HurricaneKatrina: Will Insurance Cover the Damage? The First Trial Suggests the Answer Is Yes and No, FINDLAW, Aug. 18, 2006, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/2006
0818_scales.html; Adam Scales, Remarks at Katrina Liability Issues, AEt Panel (Oct. 2005); Adam
Scales, Remarks at Insurance and Risk Allocation in America: Economics, Law, and Regulation, AEIBrookings Joint Center for Law and Regulatory Studies (Sept. 2006). I have not hesitated to criticize
extraordinarily creative, catastrophically generous decisions in favor of Katrina claimants. Adam
Scales, Insurance Ex Machina: A Significant Federal Decision in New Orleans on Post-Katrina Litigation, FINDLAW, Dec. 11, 2006, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20061211_scales.html.
2. Mississippi Attorney General Jim Hood, Remarks at Hurricane Katrina: A Legal Symposium, Mississippi College School of Law (Aug. 29, 2006).
3. See Martin Wolk, How HurricaneKatrina's Costs Are Adding Up: Insurance Industry Costs
Plus Federal Outlays Could Equal "$200 Billion Event," MSNBC.coM, Sept. 13, 2005, http://www.
msnbc.msn.comlid/9329293/. Such estimates do not capture the wide-ranging economic impact of social
dislocation in the wake of a catastrophe, and neither do existing insurance mechanisms. For example,
RAND estimates that New Orleans may regain just over half of its pre-Katrina population by September 2008. Press Release, Rand.org, RAND Study Estimates New Orleans Populationto Climb to About
272,000 in 2008, Mar. 15, 2006, http://www.rand.org/news/press.06/03.15.html. No extant insurance
product indemnifies against the depopulation and economic leveling of a metropolis.
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single actor is vested with both the incentive and the power to manage this
risk effectively.
As with healthcare, the system for allocating catastrophic loss is characterized primarily by the evasion of responsibility at all levels: private,
commercial, and governmental. The result (as in healthcare) has been dysfunction. Before Katrina's seemingly indelible memories recede-as they
are destined to-it is time to recalibrate the relationship between government and the private market.
This Article focuses on the two insurance systems that inadequately
govern the distribution of flood risk: The National Flood Insurance Program ("NFIP") and the private market for property insurance. There have
been a number of studies detailing the structure and limits of these systems.
However, scant attention has been directed toward the role that insurance
law plays in driving the systems toward failure. What follows is a synthesis
of insurance law, economics, and regulatory criticism, leading to the ineluctable conclusion that these two systems rest on a foundation of sand.
I propose a market-based alternative that draws on the comparative
advantages each system offers. To the information-generating of the marketplace, we may add a more precisely targeted governmental role in subsidizing some policyholders and reinsuring others. There are inevitable
tradeoffs, and my proposal has a number of drawbacks-only some of
which can be guessed at here. But the alternative is a system that has
proven itself unable to cope adequately with the predictable losses of a bad
year, let alone the greatest natural disaster in American history.4
II.

FROM PUBLIC TO PRIVATE AND BACK

Insurance is the principal private mechanism for distributing risks
across time and space. Government is its public counterpart, and they
share many attributes. Structurally, they are means to reduce the incidence
and severity of risk, while ameliorating its impact when it cannot be
avoided. Conceptually, there is no limit to the scope of hazards potentially
controllable by these mechanisms: Death may come for all, but its financial
impact can be diffused by life insurance or government survivor's benefits.
Oil drilling's spectacular capacity for spontaneous combustion made the
early petroleum industry untenable-until insurance products were devised
to smooth out the vagaries of chance.
4. Katrina destroyed approximately 275,000 homes (estimates vary) and is expected to result in
1.6 million insurance claims. This Article concerns itself primarily with flood-related losses and identifies claiming dynamics that make the resolution of such losses particularly problematic. However, a
strong argument exists for applying its analyses and recommendations to all forms of catastrophic loss,
and several commentators have urged comprehensive inclusion of catastrophe risks in homeowners
policies. Robert E. Litan, Preparingfor Future "Katrinas," THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, Policy Brief
#150 (Mar. 2006), available at http://www.brookings.edu/comm/policybriefs/pbl50.pdf; Howard
Kunreuther, Has the Time Come for Comprehensive NaturalDisasterInsurance?, in ON RISK AND DisASTER: LESSONS FROM HURRICANE KATRINA (Ronald J. Daniels, Donald F. Kettl & Howard C.
Kunreuther eds., 2006); see also Raymond J. Burby, Hurricane Katrina and the Paradoxes of Government DisasterPolicy: BringingAbout Wise GovernmentalDecisions for HazardousAreas, THE ANNALS
OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE, Vol. 604 No. 1 (2006).
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Government may take on an obvious role as insurer, as when it provides Social Security or Medicare. It may assume insurance roles that private insurance is unlikely to play, as evidenced by Churchill's more-or-less
extemporaneous decision to regard private losses incurred during the
London Blitz as "a charge upon the State."5 Less obvious is the insurance
character of many government activities, including the maintenance of national defense, the creation of a public health infrastructure, and product
regulation. These quintessentially governmental activities typically involve
neither explicit ex ante payments ("premiums") nor cash transfers from
groups to individuals ("benefits" or "claims"). Yet they all shape the redistribution of risk as surely as private insurance does.
Even less obvious are the governance roles played by private insurance. Insurance systems create strong incentives for private actors to do
more than take the risk landscape as they find it; insurance companies
predicate their willingness to write policies on the employment of risk-reduction strategies by insureds and other actors.6 In turn, insureds find that
many activities are simply infeasible absent insurance. For individuals,
auto insurance is a (somewhat under-enforced) condition of registering a
car, and no lender is willing to offer a mortgage without homeowners coverage in place. These arrangements create positive externalities not only
for obvious beneficiaries such as other motorists, but for homebuilders,
communities, and society as a whole.
Private insurance arrangements can thus complement or-in theoryentirely supplant public regulation as access to risk spreading becomes essential for private activity. But insurers are no more interested in creating
positive externalities than any other class of rational actors. The beneficiaries of those externalities are similarly disposed to reap without toil absent an enforcement mechanism. In a market economy within a
decentralized system of government, such mechanisms are hard to come
by. This is the picture of dysfunctional interdependence that emerges from
the study of flood insurance risks.

5.

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, MEMOIRS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

371-72 (Houghton Mifflin

1987).
6. See generally RICHARD V. ERICSON, AARON DOYLE & DEAN BARRY, INSURANCE AS Gov(Univ. of Toronto Press 2003); TOM BAKER & JONATHAN SIMON, EMBRACING RISK: THE
CHANGING CULTURE OF INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY (Univ. of Chicago Press 2002). A fascinating, if somewhat humbling study of this thesis is emerging in a series of articles by Professors Tom
Baker and Sean Griffith. Drawing on the "insurance as governance" literature, they extend it through
a qualitative study of the relationship between corporate governance practices and D&O insurers. Tom
Baker & Sean J. Griffith, Predicting Corporate Governance Risk: Evidence from the Directors' and
Officers' Liability Insurance Market, U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007). D&O liability has received
substantial public, scholarly, and legal attention in the post-Enron era; insurance governance theory
predicts that liability insurers, as the ultimate internalizers of corporate misgovernance risks, ought to
be developing and enforcing models of "best practices" upon corporate officers in order to mitigate
those risks. In fact, Professors Baker and Griffith have discerned little, if any, evidence of systematic
private governance by D&O insurers. Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, The Missing Monitor in Corporate
Governance: The Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurer, GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2007).
ERNANCE
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Historically, the principal source of flood-related risk was riverine (i.e.,

the overflow of'rivers) rather than coastal.7 The fertile soils of the alluvial
plain constituted a tremendous resource that could not be exploited adequately because of periodic flooding. 8 Since the 1830s, the federal government has acted to control flooding, principally through levees and other

public works projects. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, which is primarily responsible for these tasks, has been an enthusiastic proponent of its
services. 9

Flood control projects merely buy time. It has been observed that
there are two types of levees: Those that have failed, and those that will. 10

Thus, the government has been obliged to offer post-disaster assistance in
the form of loans and grants to flood victims. This points to a self-destructive pattern that has long characterized flood mitigation efforts. As floodcontrol works are brought online, the value of once-and future-flood-

ravaged lands increases. Residential and commercial development (along
with agricultural) are attracted, often resting on long-term assumptions
about the suitability of the area for development.11
Of course, such efforts have marked the upward ascent of civilization;
there is nothing inherently wrong with taming wilderness for development.
But doing so magnifies exponentially the economic risks flood control
projects are designed to manage. By creating the illusion that alluvial and
coastal plains can be made safe for development, government policy ensures that there will be greater dislocation when-not if-that safety is revealed as illusory. It is no surprise that, by the 1990s, flood losses averaged

over $6 billion annually. 2 In the absence of firm risk management controls, the tendency of flood losses is both cyclical and upward.
7. Rawle 0. King, Federal Flood Insurance: The Repetitive Loss Problem, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV.,CRS REP. RL32972, at CRS-5 (June 30, 2005), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL
32972.pdf. Hurricane Katrina has single-handedly reversed that pattern, creating losses that exceed all
combined riverine losses in recorded American history.
8. Readers not familiar with the geology of the Mississippi River basin system may find excellent technical descriptions in MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT (Penguin Books 1993) and JOHN M.

1927 AND How IT CHANGED AMERICA (Simon & Schuster 1997). A typical riverine flood plain may extend for dozens of miles beyond a river's
banks; even a modest overflow can inundate hundreds of thousands of square miles because there are
no natural obstructions.
9. Rarely has validity of public choice theory been so comprehensively sustained. See REISNER,
supra note 8 (documenting the federal government's unswerving confidence in its abilities to reshape
the landscape to its liking, realities notwithstanding).
10. "For over a hundred years, man has thought that he could tame the waterways. We have
built 'levees, then floodways, then reservoirs, and finally pumping, drainage, and channel building
projects to protect and facilitate development of the nation's floodplains.' At nearly every step, we have
lost." Beth Davidson, How Quickly We Forget: The National Flood Insurance Programand Floodplain
Development in Missouri, 19 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 365, 388 (2005).
11. See Burby, supra note 4, at 6 (explaining how the intended effect of facilitating development
has unintended effect of increasing particularly risky development).
12. This represents a doubling since the 1980s. See King, supra note 7, at CRS-1. Although
global warming or cyclical climate changes may explain part of this increase, it is more likely due to the
changes in residential patterns and asset appreciation induced by flood-mitigation efforts, including
flood insurance.
BARRY, RISING TIDE: THE GREAT Mississippi FLOOD OF
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Private flood insurance was once widely available in two related forms.
First, because of a long-standing conceptual error,' 3 flooding losses were
often covered as a type of accident within the meaning of accident policies.
Second, flood insurance could be added to the perils covered in a fire insurance policy, which until the 1950s was the dominant form of personal property coverage available.' 4 Several features of flood insurance have made it
unattractive for private insurers, and what interest there was ended with
the two thousand miles of flooding that took place along the Mississippi
River in 1927.'5
The absence of private insurance only exacerbated the pressure on the
government to mitigate the effects of flood losses. Moreover, the 1927
flood also ushered in a sustained expectation of federal assistance-an expectation subsequently nurtured by the New Deal. It is surely no coincidence, then, that the federal government formalized its role in flood risk
management during the brief apogee of post-New Deal confidence in governmental effectiveness. The NFIP is not among the most familiar of Great
Society programs, but, like its cousins, it stands as a monument to genuine
optimism.

III.

THE TWIN FAILURES OF CATASTROPHE RISK MANAGEMENT

The NFIP is the government's answer to market failure in flood insurance. Less obviously, it is also an administrative technology for addressing
governmental failure in flood mitigation.
A.

Market Failure

Market failure may be defined as a condition in which economically
rational transactions do not take place. 6 Flood insurance, like any casualty, is not inherently uninsurable. However, it suffers from unusual demand- and supply-side constraints that make it a relatively difficult market
for insurers, and they have responded rationally by avoiding it.
13. See Adam F. Scales, Man, God and the Serbonian Bog: The Evolution of Accidental Death
Insurance, 86 IOWA L. REV. 173 (2000).
14. Fire policies eventually were enfolded within a package of insurances comprising the modern
homeowners policy.
15. See King, supra note 7, at CRS-2 n.7. Private insurance has remained available on a limited
basis in two principal forms: "Difference in Conditions" coverage protecting business from the economic dislocation of flooding (though the amount of coverage available does not provide true catastrophic protection) and flood insurance, which has been recently rolled into high-end homeowners
policies by a few insurers in select markets. See Rachel Emma Silverman, Flood Coverage for Costly
Homes, REALESTATEJOU RNAL.COM, Sept. 2, 2005, http://www.realestatejournal.com/buysell/taxesand
insurance/20050902-silverman.html.
16. There appears to be little disagreement among economists that insurance against catastrophic
loss is indeed a victim of market failure. See Mario Jametti & Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg, Risk
Selection in Natural Disaster Insurance-the Case of France 2-3 (CESinfo, Working Paper No. 1683,

2006), available at http://www.cesifo-group.de/-DocCIDL/cesifol-wpl683.pdf. Interestingly, there
does appear to be dissent from some insurance companies and insurance professionals. At a conference at which the author was invited to speak, a senior attorney working on behalf of the insurance
industry stated that there was no market failure for catastrophic loss. Relatedly, at another conference,
a senior officer of a major reinsurer dissented from the author's position on insurance law reform by
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1. Insurers and Uncertainty
The science of hydrology was very poorly understood in the late nine-

teenth century, and insurance regulation in something like its modern form
emerged only gradually throughout the twentieth. The history of insurance
companies until well into the 1900s is one of boom and bust, and a substantial flood could easily founder undercapitalized insurers. By the mid-to-

late twentieth century, this information deficit was essentially unchanged as
far as private insurers were concerned.17 Without reasonably accurate data

to generate loss predictions, insurance cannot be correctly priced. In that
environment, insurers will either decline to provide coverage entirely or
will charge what Howard Kunreuther has labeled an "ambiguity premium"

that reflects surprisingly pronounced risk aversion by the insurer.18
Furthermore, flood insurance presents a vexing adverse selection
problem. The people most likely to buy insurance against flood losses are
also the most likely to suffer them. That is, the motivated pool of actual
insurance consumers is generally more risky than the pool of all potential
consumers. Adverse selection occurs when insureds know more about

their risk profiles than their insurers. Although this is unlikely to be true
for a group of policyholders (whose riskiness is likely to be average), it can
be true for particularconsumers of insurance. Much of the economic struc-

ture of the insurance contract is designed to minimize the risk that insureds
will obtain incorrectly-priced protection. To the extent that a consumer has
particular insight into his riskiness (e.g., whether one locks one's car or the
amount one smokes), insurers will either charge an inadequate premium or
write insurance they otherwise would decline.
2.

Adverse Selection
Adverse selection has long been thought capable of creating a "death

spiral" in which an unfortunate insurance pool begins to attract riskier insureds and to deter good risks-because the former are getting a good deal
arguing that, given the high rates of closed claims following Katrina (estimates range from the high-80s
to mid-90s), there was, a priori, no problem in need of reform.
This view may be understood as an indication of the extent to which insurers believe that catastrophic losses are not their concern. Given that an event on the scale of Katrina has left the insurance
industry relatively unscathed (it has thus far expended approximately $50 billion in a disaster that has
inflicted at least $200 billion in direct losses), such events may be thought not to directly threaten the
health of the insurance industry. In that sense, perhaps, there is "no problem."
In this Article, I offer some reasons why insurers are not as insulated as they believe; in fact, their
exposure to certain catastrophic losses is significantly higher than insurance language and extant catastrophe models predict. My thesis is that catastrophic losses are, indeed, everyone's problem-but particularly insurers'.
17. King, supra note 7, at CRS-2; Edward T. Pasterick, The National Flood Insurance Program,
in PAYING THE PRICE: THE STATUS AND ROLE OF INSURANCE AGAINST NATURAL DISASTERS IN THE

at 125-154 (Howard Kunreuther & Richard J. Roth eds., 1998).
18. Howard Kunreuther, The Need for Comprehensive Disaster Insurance: Roles of the Public
and Private Sector, in ON RISK AND DISASTER: LESSONS FROM HURRICANE KATRINA 182 (Ronald J.
Daniels, Donald F. Kettl & Howard C. Kunreuther eds., 2006) (citing Howard Kunreuther et al., Insurer Ambiguity and Market Failure, 7 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 71-87 (1993)) (documenting survey
research finding hypothetical average premiums set by insurers would be 1.43 to 1.77 times higher for
ambiguous probabilities of loss, versus well-specified probabilities for the same risk).
UNITED STATES,
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and the latter are overpaying. In theory, such a pool will eventually collapse, as the necessary rise in premiums reshapes the pool into an increasingly narrow band of highly risky consumers who (at some point) can no
longer afford the actuarially correct premium.' 9
Peter Siegelman has offered a powerful refutation of the long-held assumption that such collapses are inevitable and have in fact been observed. 20 However, the inexactness of early flood insurance practices
imparts a unique plausibility to the view, commonly held in the insurance
industry, that adverse selection risk is a significant deterrent to private
flood insurance. Moreover, this industry view might contribute to what
Mario Jametti and Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg have described as "risk
selection," in which private agents cede high insurance risks "to the public
part of the private-public partnership. ' 21 This dynamic helps to explain
insurers' reticence to re-enter the flood insurance market, particularly
where the government has already stepped in.
3.

Perception-Based Demand Constraints

A contrapuntal challenge to insurance for catastrophic loss is a lack of
demand. Individuals routinely underestimate the likelihood of lowprobability, high-loss events. Potential consumers bring a cluster of heuristics to their decision to purchase insurance, all of which depress demand.
These heuristics can be divided into two basic categories.
Meteorologists, hydrologists, and actuaries attach specific meaning to
terms such as "100-year flood."'2 2 The term means that there is a 1% annual probability of a flood occurring to a specified height over a certain
area. What the average person actually understands, however, is that once
there has already been such a flood in his area, he is safe for the next
ninety-nine years. 23 In fact, the risk of flood is unchanged, as is the rationality of purchasing flood insurance. The failure to apprehend this concept
is known as the gambler's fallacy.
At the same time, individuals respond differently to risks that present
themselves as remote or abstract than to those that are salient-i.e., distinctive. Risk perceptions change in the presence of recent disasters in
ways that can be quite favorable (albeit briefly) for insurance decisions.
19. In this classic insurance nightmare, one sees the contradiction at the heart of private insurance: Insurance works-indeed, it is "insurance," rather than something else-only because of the
uncertainty as to the timing, magnitude, or distribution of losses. Competitive insurance markets tend
over time to reduce uncertainty by screening for risk. As they do, insurance pools become increasingly
homogenous and individual variation within them less likely. But in a perfectly homogenous insurance
pool, there would be no consumers, for there is no "risk" to insure.
20. Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat, 113 YALE
L.J. 1223 (2004).
21. Jametti & von Ungern-Sternberg, supra note 16, at 2.
22. Kunreuther, supra note 4, at 199.
23. See, e.g., Robert J. Aalberts, HurricaneKatrina: Will New Orleans Real Estate Emerge from
the Devastation?,34 REAL EST. L.J. I, i (2005) (wherein the. author, editor-in-chief of a journal devoted
to real estate law, acknowledges he routinely assumed that his New Orleans apartment, once flooded,
certainly would not soon be hit again by a "100-year flood").
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Immediately after disasters, people's ability to recognize and correctly at-

tribute the risks of the disaster is heightened; this undoubtedly explains the
rise in demand for flood insurance during the two years after Hurricane
Andrew and the year since Hurricane Katrina. However, with time, the
sense of risk fades and people return to their pre-catastrophe optimism.
Robert Meyer has offered a resume of these phenomena and relevant literature that cannot be improved upon by repetition here.24

4.

Post-Occurrence Insurance
One of the more intriguing hypotheses regarding the lack of demand

for catastrophic insurance coverage is the idea that rational consumers may
well forgo purchasing insurance now because they expect to be provided
with "free insurance" later in the form of government grants, loans, or
other forms of post-disaster insurance.2 This is an extremely appealing
hypothesis, but Kunreuther and others point out that it has not been substantiated. For one thing, post-disaster flood assistance has predominantly
taken the form of Small Business Association loans which are hard to characterize as windfalls. Moreover, community-level disaster relief is correlated with greater local mitigation efforts. Post-loss assistance does not,
therefore, appear to be associated with lesser prospective care, an as-yet
unexplained result that Kunreuther correctly describes as "counterintuitive. ' 1 6 Although it would seem extremely odd for individuals' risk decisions to be totally unaffected by the expectation of future assistance, for
now the hypothesis must be characterized as "not proven. "27
Another theme that recurs in explanations of insurers' unwillingness
to provide coverage is the concept of correlated losses. Casualty losses are
generally uncorrelated. That is, the likelihood that the reader will be involved in a traffic accident today has almost no bearing on whether his
neighbor will as well. Even devastating losses (such as fire or collapse)
24. Robert J. Meyer, Why We Under-Preparefor Hazards, in ON RISK AND DISASTER: LESSONS
FROM HURRICANE KATRINA (Ronald J. Daniels, Donald F. Kettl & Howard C. Kunreuther eds., 2006).

25. Burby, supra note 4, at 9 (citing the House Bipartisan Natural Disasters Task Force Report in
1994).
26. Kunreuther, supra note 4, at 183.
27. Burby, supra note 4, at 11-12 (concluding that multivariate analysis does not sustain significant correlation between NFIP payments and responsible land use policies); LLOYD DIXON ET AL., THE

71-73 (RAND Corp. 2006),
available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical-reports/2006/RAND TR300.pdf (finding slight relationship between floodplain enforcement and disaster assistance under one model, but not others).
Fortunately, the political response to Katrina has provided a natural experiment along these lines. Congress has authorized direct payments to homeowners who declined to purchase flood insurance in an
amount equal to the benefits to which they would have been entitled had they done so. At $150,000 per
claimant, this amount dwarfs previous post-disaster relief by more than an order of magnitude. (It is
also smaller than the maximum $250,000/structure, $150,000/contents available through the NFIP, but is
almost exactly the average NFIP policy value. See DIxoN ET AL., supra note 27, at 27). The nearabsence of public debate on this topic goes some way toward explaining why the NFIP is both a failure
on its own terms and a systematic deterrent to the re-emergence of a private flood insurance marketwhatever motivated the purchase decisions of prudent pre-Katrina homeowners, it is difficult to imagine they will not draw some rather obvious lessons about the credibility of NFIP's implicit requirement
that one actually purchase insurance ex ante.
NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM'S MARKET PENETRATION RATE
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while certainly catastrophic for victims, do little to upset the balance of a
finely-tuned risk pool. Losses due to flood, earthquake, or windstorm,
however, tend to be highly correlated within geographic areas. That is, if
A's house is lost to flood, it is extremely likely that B's house, located
nearby, has been exposed to the same forces. Although seemingly random
distributions of misfortune in post-disaster areas are hardly uncommon,
these misfortunes are much more closely correlated than is the case with
non-catastrophic events.
This introduces a problem that is more complex than it first appears.
Insurers modeling loss exceedance probabilities do not simply raise premiums to reflect the higher average risk for correlated losses; correlation itself
induces greater variability in losses, leading to significantly higher premiums (assuming insurers do not avoid underwriting altogether)., 8 Moreover, the economic structure of modern insurers attempts to cabin
geographically correlated losses as narrowly as possible. For example, although major insurers nominally remain in regularly inundated states such
as Florida and Louisiana, these are subsidiary operations only. In theory, if
losses exceed the insurer's "pain threshold," there is no claim to the assets
of the parent corporation (a distinction insurers do not underscore in their

advertisements)

29

Combined with the adverse selection problem noted above (Midwesterners, for example, do not purchase earthquake insurance), the result is
that private catastrophic risk management in practice has lost a good deal
of its portfolio character; underwriting losses in one region are not as easily
offset by operational or investment gains elsewhere. Insurance companies
correctly point out that they cannot be expected to use profitable lines of
business to subsidize unprofitable ones, and in the absence of aggressive
(and probably counterproductive) rate regulation, they will not.30
28. N. Scott Arnold, The Role of Government in Responding to Natural Catastrophes, J. DES
(Dec. 2000), available at http://media.hoover.org/documents/0817928022_1.pdf, at 14-15.
29. Florida recently took the unusual step of prohibiting national insurers from forming new
subsidiaries so as to limit their exposures. See Staff Analysis for House Bill 1A CS Hurricane Preparedness and Insurance (on file with author). I generally favor restricting corporations from limiting their
liabilities through the entirely unpersuasive fiction that wholly-owned subsidiaries are "independent."
However, I am skeptical that a rule which permits "granddaughtering" of previously-established subsidiaries provides consumers with substantially more protection against insurer insolvency.
30. Insurers frequently describe the property/casualty coverage in hurricane-prone states as unprofitable. This observation needs to be unpacked somewhat. In some states, homeowners lines have
been unprofitable; insurance industry critics prefer to focus on aggregate data, and on that score, the
property and casualty insurance business remains very attractive indeed. Nevertheless, insurance operates on a global scale, and capital will naturally move to places of maximum profitability. Given the
instability of certain insurance markets and insurers' increasingly sophisticated techniques for segmenting operations and investment therein, all that is required is that these lines be somewhat less profitable
for substantial capital outflows to occur. That condition is amply fulfilled by homeowners insurers' loss
experiences during the past decade.
Moreover, I think it is very questionable to demand that insurers cross-subsidize lines of business,
as a number of commentators have suggested, directly or otherwise. The fact is that capital markets will
perform this function even if insurers are debarred from doing so (by reallocating capital away from
overly exposed businesses). Moreover, simple appeal to the risk-spreading function of insurance does
not provide an argument as to why automobile drivers in, say, Minnesota, have a responsibility, qua
ECONOMISTES ET DES ETUDES HUMAINES 10
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Governmental Failure

Proponents of the NFIP recognized the inefficient and ad hoc character of post-disaster assistance. By creating an insurance market, they
hoped to induce would-be recipients of aid to pre-fund their assistance.
Consumers, however, were not the only intended target of the NFIP.
Land use planning has remained an almost exclusively local concern,
despite the obvious transjurisdictional effects of local decisions.3 1 NFIPbacked insurance was conceived of as a way of inducing communities to
adopt flood mitigation policies that the federal government-even at the
height of the Great Society-could not compel.3 2 Citizens would not be
eligible to purchase flood insurance if their communities did not participate
in the NFIP. In theory this would motivate communities to remain compliant, because their citizens would correctly value the benefit of access to
flood insurance and demand appropriate action from governmental
officials.
Governments, like individuals, are subject to many of the cognitive
biases that constrain the development of private catastrophe insurance.
They are entirely capable of betting substantial amounts of their welfare
(and that of others) on the long-term absence of catastrophe. Immediate
and often mundane needs frequently take priority over seemingly more esoteric and remote risks such as floodplain management.33 For example,
virtually none of the failures that occurred during Katrina were unusual or
unforeseen. Two years earlier, New Orleans had been specifically warned
that over 100,000 people would be unable to flee the city unassisted in the
event of catastrophe. 34 The fractured and ineffective management of interdependent levees along the river has been long understood. No resident of
New Orleans could be surprised that pumping stations installed in 1915,
and which cannot reliably counter a summer thunderstorm, would fail
automobile drivers, to subsidize homeowners in Mississippi. As I argue below, there is a political and
pragmatic basis for subsidy, and history suggests it is inevitable. But that basis may not be found in the
misfortune some policyholders may have in doing business with an insurer that also writes high-risk
insurance policies. Nothing in the concept of insurance requires inter-class subsidies; whether to do so
is a policy and political choice that balances competing visions of what insurance ought to do.
31. In an ironic reprise of the shameful lifeboat mentality of New Orleans during the 1927 Mississippi River Flood (in which New Orleans business interests, with the concurrence of the state, dynamited levees protecting the adjacent and relatively poor Plaquemines Parish in order to avoid putting
New Orleans at risk), a Missouri task force concluded that Missouri's decentralized system of floodplain management "'invite[d] levee wars-a situation where each community . . . is encouraged to
continue building his levee higher and stronger in order to protect his interest and ensure river water
flows elsewhere .... But by everyone adopting this strategy, the aggregate result appears to actually
increase the flood danger by increasing the height and velocity of the river flow during floods."' Davidson, supra note 10, at 387 n.145.
32. King, supra note 7, at CRS-19; Burby, supra note 4, at 8-10.
33. Burby, supra note 4, at 9 (citing DENNIS S. MILETI, DISASTERS BY DESIGN: A REASSESSMENT
OF NATURAL HAZARDS IN THE UNITED STATES 160 (Joseph Henry Press 1999); Peter J. May, Addressing Public Risks: Federal Earthquake Policy Design, J. OF POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 10, 263-85
(1991)).
34. Jonathan Walters & Donald F. Kettl, The Katrina Breakdown, in ON RISK AND DISASTER:
LESSONS FROM HURRICANE KATRINA 258 (Ronald J. Daniels, Donald F. Kettl & Howard C.
Kunreuther eds., 2006).
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when all public systems have been inundated during a hurricane. 35 Then
again, maintaining a sinking metropolis that sits several feet below sea level
is perhaps the ultimate faith-based initiative; these failures are surprising
only in their capacity to shock.
The NFIP was intended to change this by building incentives for forward-looking floodplain management. After a slow start, over 20,000 communities have come to participate.3 6 There can be little question that the
NFIP has regularized the process of federal and state partnership in floodplain management. However, while local communities appear to be doing
more, pre-Katrina insured flood losses have crept up to an average of $1.2
billion a year.37 In one sense, the NFIP was a victim of its own success, as
floodplain management (rather than floodplain abandonment) encouraged
development and, thus, concentrated rather than dispersed economic risks
of flooding. Moreover, the NFIP's enforcement mechanisms are limited
and not credibly invoked. For years, approximately 1% of NFIP-insured
properties have accounted for nearly 30% of all NFIP losses (which is only
a fraction of total flood losses, as explained below). 38 No private insurer
would tolerate the blatant moral hazard at work here, and it is hard to
know whether one should be astonished more by the shameless refusal of
NFIP participants to rebuild or relocate so as to minimize risk or by the
incompetent bureaucracy that continued to tolerate it.3 9
1. Program Structure and Evolution
The NFIP has been something of a bureaucratic nomad. Originally
located in the Department for Housing and Urban Development, it migrated to FEMA and was most recently rolled into the Emergency Response and Preparedness Directorate, colloquially known as Homeland
Security. While flooding has undeniable impacts on housing and
emergency preparedness, none of these are obvious locations for a public
35. See DOUGLAS G. BRINKLEY, THE GREAT DELUGE: HURRICANE KATRINA, NEW ORLEANS,
AND THE Mississippi GULF COAST 130-31 (Harper Collins 2006). Brinkley suggests that properlymanned pumps (they were abandoned, along with the rest of New Orleans government during the
storm) could have reduced the damage in some areas. Other accounts have attributed the failures to
capacity, mechanical breakdown, and a lack of electricity. Undeniably, these essential systems lacked
the redundancy that is required of any intelligently designed emergency system.
36. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-606T, FLOOD INSURANCE: CHALLENGES FACING THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM 3 n.1 (Apr. 2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/
cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-606T [hereinafter GAO FLOOD INSURANCE] (statement for the record by
JayEtta Z. Hecker, Director of Physical Infrastructure).
37. FEMA, Loss Dollars Paid by Calendar Year: 1978-2005, www.fema.govfbusiness/nfip/statistics/cy2005lsdl.shtm (last visited Jan. 18, 2007) (average annual loss from 2000-2004).
38. King, supra note 7, at CRS-20.
39. FEMA-of which NFIP is a somewhat incongruous part-is an easy target in the wake of
Katrina. The NFIP's failures are perhaps best understood not as those of a rogue agency untethered to
proper political oversight, but rather one that reflects the political environment only too well. Few
economists would sanction the NFIP's inconsistent and counterproductive signals to consumers and
communities. But then, few economists can be fired for overzealousness as the result of a phone call
from a displeased member of Congress.
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insurance company. Assessments of NFIP have pointed to its difficulties in
competing for resources within differently missioned bureaucracies. 4 °
a.

The WYO Program

Initially, flood insurance was written through an NFIP consortium of
private insurers, but the program was plagued by mismanagement and
complexity. NFIP then directly provided insurance to the public, but, as we
shall see, the government is not a very good insurance company and this,
too, was terminated. In 1983, the NFIP mutated again into a public-private
partnership wherein private property insurers (primarily homeowners)
would market flood insurance, but the actual underwriting-risk distribution-was done by the NFIP. In essence, private insurers would function
as agents of the federal insurance scheme.
This arrangement is known as the Write-Your-Own ("WYO") program, though that title is misleading. The insurance contract is written by
the NFIP and published in the Federal Register. No deviations are permitted, and it is not governed by the law of insurance contracts generally. Insurance companies retain 30% of premiums as a commission and receive
compensation for additional loss-adjustment expenses.4 1 These insurers
are responsible for enrolling policyholders, collecting premiums, and administering claims. In a number of respects-not all intended by Congress-they resemble the administrators of ERISA plans: Private insurers
who wear one hat while fulfilling their own policy obligations and wear
another when they function as agents of the ERISA fiduciary. Similarly,
WYO insurers have been described as "fiscal agents" of the federal government, a denomination that permeates their legal relationship to
policyholders.42
The WYO program seemed an ideal way to remedy the NFIP's persistent failure to sell many flood policies. Private insurers are presumably
more motivated and adept at selling insurance than the federal government. But WYO was neither the first nor the last strategy so employed. In
fact, the inception of the WYO program had a very modest impact on flood
insurance participation.4 3 Measuring NFIP participation with respect to
the most at-risk communities is surprisingly difficult, and rates vary regionally and within affected areas. A series of studies undertaken during the
past decade has produced widely-divergent results; neither FEMA nor the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 44 can reach consensus on the
level of NFIP participation. Official estimates have ranged from 16% and
33% overall to approximately one-half of homes subject to mandatory
40. GAO FLOOD INSURANCE, supra note 36, at 3.
41. King, supra note 7, at CRS-10.
42.

42 U.S.C. § 4071 (a)(1) (2006).

43. See FEMA, Total Policies in Force by Calendar Year, http://www.fema.gov/business/nfip/statistics/cy2005pif.shtm (last visited Jan. 18, 2007) (showing modest increase in PIF during the 1980s).
44. The OCC has a jurisdictional interest in flood insurance because of a series of steps taken by
Congress with a view toward linking mortgages and flood insurance. The efficacy of those efforts remains in question. See DIXON ET AL., supra note 27.
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flood insurance requirements.4 5 The most comprehensive public study to

date estimates that approximately one-half of homes most at risk are insured against flood.4 6 The estimated take-up rate rises to as high as 80%
for homes subject to mortgages originated after 1994,'4 but there is substantial regional and data quality variation that make precise assessments
impossible. For example, fewer than one-in-ten residents along the Gulf
Coast of Mississippi are believed to have held flood insurance prior to Katrina. 48 In the South generally, participation has been estimated at 61%.41
However, in New Orleans, a combination of substantial poverty and the

exemption from flood purchase requirements stemming from the (failed)
levee system suggest lower participation."

Overall, there are approxi-

mately 5.3 million policies representing $874 billion of insurance in force,51
although there are at least twice as many homes located in areas of highest

flood risk.52 For several reasons, this is a mystery.
b.

Subsidy

Insurance is a curiously retrospective business; only by examining the
past does it prepare estimates of the future. Calculation of risks requires a
set of data describing the external world and policy language enumerating
the subset of events for which coverage is offered. Insurance is not the

most difficult of businesses to get into if one follows in the footsteps of
others, as most do. However, it is a very difficult business to originate.
This was the quandary faced by the NFIP at its inception: How to price a
product no one had sold for thirty years, such that consumers would actually purchase it and the pool would remain solvent?
The problem was that there simply was no data at hand immediately
translatable into an insurance rate structure; 53 if there had been, many
consumers likely would have been priced out of the market. The NFIP's
45. GAO FLOOD INSURANCE, supra note 36. Throughout this Article, I use terms such as "high
risk" to refer to homes located within a 100-year floodplain; such areas are denominated "Special Flood
Hazard Areas" ("SFHA"). A home located in such an area would receive an NFIP rating of "SFHA
A," denoting highest risk, absent flood-mitigation efforts such as elevation or a levee. It is this designation that triggers the mandatory insurance requirement for mortgaged properties.
46.

DIXON ET AL., supra note 27, at xvii.

47.

KEVIN F. MCCARTHY ET AL., THE REPOPULATION OF NEW ORLEANS AFTER HURRICANE

KATRINA 19 (RAND Corp. 2006).

48. Richard Scruggs, Remarks at Hurricane Katrina: A Legal Symposium, Mississippi College
School of Law (Aug. 29, 2006).
49.

MCCARTHY ET AL., supra note 47, at 43.

50. Editorial, Rethinking Flood Insurance, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 2005, at A22.
51. FEMA, Total Coverage by Calendar Year, http://www.fema.gov/business/nfip/statistics/cy
2005cov.shtm. (last visited Jan. 18, 2007). This is a 13% increase since Hurricane Katrina, the secondbiggest gain in policies in force since 1979. Direct underwriting began in 1978.
52. MCCARTHY ET AL., supra note 47, at 18.

53. This is an excellent illustration of how insurance "maps" our understanding of the world.
Because for decades no one wrote flood insurance policies, there was no economic structure in place to
assure the generation of information about flood risks. Unlike auto accident or fire risks, insurers have
not directly faced financial consequences for failing to correctly predict the path of flooding. Absent
such consequences, insurers have no particular interest in academic hydrological exploration. The
problem that has long bedeviled the NFIP is that no one else does either.
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solution was to subsidize policies within the pool of flood insurance consumers 54 while undertaking to create the required data. These subsidies
are substantial and reach deep into the risk pool. On the theory that preNFIP homes were neither constructed nor priced with flood risk in mind,
such homes were "grandfathered" into eligibility for subsidy. The NFIP
estimated that the turnover in housing stock would require premium subsidies for twenty-five years. As of this writing, 38 years have passed, and
approximately 28% of NFIP policies remain subsidized. This in fact reflects
substantial progress, as the subsidization rate was originally 70%." 5
c.

Accounting

The NFIP uses a cash-based method for accounting and determining
premiums.5 6 The program is not set up to generate significant loss reserves
to be used in "bad years." Instead, total premium income is preset annually to match a moving twenty-five year average annual loss experience.
Within that "cap," premiums vary by risk and the grandfathering rules described above. This results in two interesting phenomena, one of which
undermines public confidence in the NFIP while the other undermines the
foundations of the program.
First, the finances of the program have oscillated significantly, swinging from deficit to surplus each year. 57 The NFIP has statutory borrowing
authority, and claims continue to be paid in deficit years. However, this
does not create the appearance that the NFIP is on sound financial footing.
For example, when 155,000 claims were filed in September 2005, the NFIP
temporarily ran out of money and reached the limit of its borrowing authority. Although claims were ultimately paid, such embarrassments do little to instill public confidence in the NFIP.
The other problem with this type of insurance accounting is actual unsoundness. Cash-based (rather than accrual) budgeting significantly understates the true liabilities of the system. Recall the pattern of increasing
flood losses throughout the 1990s to the present. A moving average exposure does not provide an accurate picture of likely exposure today. Moreover, much of the rise in the NFIP's insurance in force can be explained by
real estate appreciation rather than an expanding claims base. In other
words, the portfolio of claims is becoming riskier simply by virtue of its
54. That is, while substantial, the NFIP subsidy does not create a direct charge to the Treasury;
non-subsidized policyholders pay higher-than-required rates so that others within the pool may pay
rates lower than they would otherwise be charged. Pasterick, supra note 17, at 134. Cf King, supra

note 7, at CRS-16 Table 1 (noting that NFIP deficit borrowings were forgiven by congressional appropriation through 1985). This observation loses its force when one considers the historical swings in

NFIP finances; after a flood loss, there was no requirement that the collecting insured remain in the risk
pool so as to eventually "pay back" some of the claim in the form of increased premiums. In 2005, for

example, the NFIP paid over $16 billion in Katrina-related claims-more than it had paid in the entire
history of the direct-underwriting program.
55.

King, supra note 7, at CRS-15.

56. GAO

FLOOD INSURANCE,

supra note 36, at 5-6.

57. See King, supra note 7, at CRS-16 Table 1.
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constituent homes becoming more expensive. Moreover, cash-basis accounting masks other changes in meteorological and residential patterns
that create higher-than-experienced flood risks. The upshot is that none of
the prices charged to NFIP policyholders-including the unsubsidized
ones-reflect a realistic picture of their risk.
C.

The Missing Monitor"

None of these features explain why so few homeowners choose to
purchase flood insurance. Given that it is both intentionally and unintentionally subsidized, it is an excellent deal for most and a steal for others;
flood insurance should be very popular indeed. Of course, the dynamics
described above that constrain the native demand for catastrophe risk help
explain this phenomenon. But they do not explain the apparent failure of
private insurers to create demand.
Private insurers are merely agents of the NFIP; by writing policies they
incur no underwriting risk whatsoever. Moreover, they receive significant
commission payments and full compensation for loss-adjustment expenses.
In light of this, private insurers should be highly motivated sellers of flood
insurance, but they are not. Various reasons have been advanced to explain this failure, including insurance agents' continued unfamiliarity with
flood insurance and the asserted complexities of writing policies. None of
these explanations are persuasive. For some reason, the insurance industry
is simply not interested in helping the federal government achieve greater
market penetration of flood insurance-an assistance that is by no means
required without compensation. Presumably, private insurers find marketing flood insurance rather than their own underwritten products relatively
less profitable and, therefore, direct their limited marketing resources toward the latter. However, this failure is at present an unsolved puzzle.59
The mystery deepens when one considers the full range of incentives
that ought to direct purchase decisions. Approximately 65% of owner-occupied homes are financed with, or subject to, long-term mortgages.6 °
Mortgagees have a strong interest in the preservation of pledged property,
58. A gentle reminder to Professors Baker and Griffith of the perils of circulating drafts with
catchy titles. See Baker & Griffith, supra note 6.
59. Another, more conspiratorial possibility is that insurers do not wish to depress demand for
private homeowners coverage by loudly proclaiming the importance of flood insurance. If flood insurance is so important, some consumers might say, then why is it not included in the standard homeowners policy? Or insurers might fear that underscoring flood risks may deter consumers from purchasing
homes in flood-prone areas (thus depriving insurers of the opportunity to sell their own policies).
60. DIXON ET AL., supra note 27, at 22 (citing Richard J.Tobin & Corinne Calfee, The National
Flood Insurance Program's Mandatory Purchase Requirement: Policies, Processes, and Stakeholders,
AMERICAN INsTITUTEs FOR RESEARCH (2005)). The RAND report estimates that 80-90% of high-risk
homes are subject to mandatory flood insurance purchase requirements, with a compliance rate that
ranges from 67% to as high as 80% nationwide (because the relevant datasets have been compiled for
diverse purposes and vary in quality, there is no conclusive determination of compliance available). Id.
at 23-24. However, NFIP penetration for homes not subject to the purchase requirement (either because there is no federally regulated mortgage or the home is located in what is presently considered an
area of lower flood risk) may be as low as 18%. Id. at 25. Overall, only about one-half of high-risk
homes carry flood insurance. Id.
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which is why they insist on sufficient homeowners protection before closing. This is a successful example of insurance-as-governance. Suppose that
public policy required people to maintain homeowners coverage (recall,
this is a primary source of liability protection as well). It turns out that the
need for such a law is limited, for only persons who have paid off their
mortgages will avoid the intrusive gaze of the risk-sensitive mortgagee. Today, no bank would consider offering a mortgage without a basic homowners policy in place, which automatically provides payment to the mortgagee
first in the event of loss.61 Currently, 96% of homeowners carry homeowners insurance. 62 In theory, no bank should be writing mortgages in floodprone areas without insisting on the purchase of flood insurance. No law
should be necessary, for surely financial institutions are immune from the
faulty heuristics that inhibit individuals from planning for catastrophe, no?
No, indeed. Congress has twice found it necessary to legislate incentives for the banking industry to act in its own interest, and thereby save
the federal treasury from post-disaster demands. In 1973, federally backed
mortgages required flood insurance where appropriate, and in 1994 this
requirement was significantly expanded to include all federally regulated
banks. 63 This is undoubtedly a good idea, but two questions naturally arise.
Unfortunately, the available evidence provides unsatisfactory answers.
The first question is why are such measures needed? An individual
who forgoes insurance is placing a bet that the insured casualty will not
occur. This is often mistaken, but one can perceive the outlines of a
widely-held sentiment about "paying for nothing. '64 How can supposedly
sophisticated institutions make similar bets-bets that will lose across a
portfolio of mortgages?6 5
One explanation is the principal-agent problem. There is approximately a 26% chance that a 1-in-100 flood will strike a home during the
lifetime of a 30-year mortgage. Several things have to go wrong for an optimistic bank's flood bet to go sour. First, there has to be a flood that significantly impairs the property such that the insured is likely to consider
abandonment. Second, the amount of loss, together with the insured's income, must make recourse against the homeowner financially unrewarding
for the mortgagee. But the real problem is that these events must occur on
the relevant manager's "watch"; that is, they must occur within a time horizon and organizational structure that makes it feasible for the institution to
61. Presumably, most homeowners will correctly recognize the value of insurance on their own,
though the dynamics described above are certain to result in less demand absent compulsion.
62. Ins. Info. Inst., Homeowners Insurance, Facts and Statistics, http://www.iii.org/medialfacts/
statsbyissue/homeowners/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2007).
63. GAO FLOOD INSURANCE, supra note 36, at 10.
64. As an insurance professor, it has often fallen to me to explain to intelligent people that the
absence of a loss does not imply that one has received "nothing" in exchange for an insurance premium.
But inchoate risk lacks the salience of a car accident that actually materializes, and this accounts for no
small part of public skepticism regarding insurance.
65. In the aggregate, the gains presumably exceed the occasional catastrophe. But a bank holder
of mortgages that screened for flood risk/coverage ought to enjoy a competitive advantage that would
express itself as higher gains relative to those that did not manage this risk.
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attribute responsibility to the poorly betting actor. Faced with a choice be-

tween immediate credit for generating mortgages today and a potential
problem that may crop up tomorrow when someone else is responsible,
rational agents will sell out their principals more often than not.66
But this is not the only alternative available. It is even more attractive
to persuade others to take risks off your hands. And, beginning about the
time the NFIP came online, this is precisely what mortgagees began to do.

A mortgage is generally the longest-termed financial instrument one can
hold. The risk for a bank is that a shift upwards in interest rates during the
life of the mortgage leaves the bank's capital in a less profitable position
because it has been expended to support the mortgage. This tends to make
banks hesitant to offer mortgages, and in the high-interest 1970s the federal

government created Fannie Mae to enable a secondary market in mortgages to arise. Most residential mortgages are sold within a few months of
origination, packaged along with thousands of others, and creatively exfoliated in every way imaginable. In return for cash, the originator conveniently includes the uninsured risk of catastrophic loss at no additional
charge.
Mortgage servicing facilities monitor homeowners' compliance with
insurance requirements, and this can extend to flood insurance as well.
However, there is some evidence that insureds required to purchase flood

insurance often fail to renew; 6 7 for some reason, the compliance mechanism for ordinary coverage does not work as smoothly with respect to catastrophic risks. The secondary market provides one explanation, albeit
partial, as to why.68
66. During the mortgage-refinance boom of late, a curious trend was discerned: Valuations generated by appraisers for mortgage companies tended to be reliably higher than market-based measures.
In theory, mortgage companies should have no problem weeding out unduly optimistic appraisers. In
practice, it is precisely that quality that commends them to mortgage company personnel-who can
thereby write higher mortgages. Should reality one day intrude (for example, in the collapse of a real
estate bubble), the responsible parties are long gone, perhaps with the wind of commission-generated
performance bonuses at their backs. A rather technical summary of relevant research published just
prior to the recent boom may be found in George H. Lentz & Ko Wang, Residential Appraisal and the
Lending Process: A Survey of Issues, 15 J. OF REAL EST. RES. (1998).
67. Kunreuther, supra note 4, at 179.

68. Inferential support for this "hot potato" theory is provided by surveys of California mortgage
originators. Only 13% of California homes have earthquake insurance. Why do banks not insist on it
as a continuing condition of the mortgage? Because those mortgages will be sold, and the earthquake
risk along with them. Risa Palm, Demand for DisasterInsurance: Residential Coverage, in PAYING THE
PRICE: THE STATUS AND ROLE OF INSURANCE AGAINST NATURAL DISASTERS IN THE UNITED STATES

57 (Howard Kunreuther & Richard J. Roth eds., 1998).
A colleague familiar with the secondary mortgage market is skeptical of this explanation. He
points out that purchasers of CMOs have access to impressive amounts of data that should permit them
to track flood insurance compliance and participation rates in bundled mortgages. Thus, holders of
poor flood bets should not be able to easily pass them along to others.
I am unaware of research bearing directly on the plausibility of my thesis, but the truth may lie
somewhere between these two intuitions. It turns out that data quality in the secondary mortgage
market is a longstanding concern, though it is slowly being addressed. Error rates among mortgage
lenders have been estimated at 5-14%, which implies millions of unique data errors each year throughout the secondary market. See Joseph Smialowski, The Cost of Bad Data and Bad Technology, MORTGAGE-TECHNOLOGY.COM, Feb. 20, 2007, http://www.mortgage-technology.com/plus/perspectives/.
Because flood insurance is a highly mutable characteristic of a property subject to mortgage, this data
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To what extent is this occurring, even in the post-1994 era of required
flood insurance? The accounts are conflicting, and the most comprehensive public study to date cannot decisively resolve the question. The

RAND Corporation reports that post-1994 mortgages are much likelier to
involve flood insurance (if required). 69 However, that the compliance rate
is significantly less than 100% is unquestioned. This is a modestly surprising failure of the market. It does provide in microcosm two important

points: The current structure of the NFIP does not sufficiently incentivize
private action to mitigate flood losses, and private actors have the capacity
risk onto others, further diminishing their incentives
to offload catastrophe
70
to control it.

point is more susceptible to erroneous recording. Moreover, there is a tradeoff between data integrity
(consistently and correctly ascribing to a collateralized mortgage its characteristics) and data granularity (the specificity of that characterization). Id. The current state of the art in mortgage data technology covers an astounding 3000 data points (including flood insurance), and this only captures 85% of
the mortgage life cycle. Id.
Past-due mortgage loans in the Gulf skyrocketed after Katrina, creating the expectation that actual
defaults would rise as well. John Waggoner, Mortgages Go Unpaid in Storm-Hit Areas, USA TODAY,
Sept. 29, 2005, at 3B. However, Dominion Bond Service reported that Katrina-affected areas represented less than 1% of rated loan pools and involved smaller-than-average loans. Nicholas Yulico,
Home Lenders Shake Off Katrina, THESTREET.COM, Sept. 12, 2005, http://www.thestreet.com/_tsclsii/
funds/nicholasyulico/10242195.html.
The upshot is that flood insurance participation is likely to be an extraordinarily modest factor in
the pricing of bundled mortgages, unless those bundles are concentrated in flood-prone areas. Moreover, even if such participation is fully accounted for in price (e.g., relatively nonparticipating portfolios
incur a risk premium in the form of lower selling prices), this financial markets signal is awfully distant
from the loan officers, home purchasers, and land use authorities who might theoretically make use of
it.

69. One unfortunate way in which the conceptual identity between government risk mitigation
and insurance expresses itself is the prompting of the governmentally protected to forego insurance
altogether, which can be seen in New Orleans. The levee system qualified as a "flood control device"
so as to remove at-risk homes from their natural designation requiring flood insurance (after 1994).
Even apart from this under-enforced legal constraint, the existence of the levees also contributes to a
norm of apparent safety. A natural response to this norm is to forego flood insurance altogether (although, ironically, it would be extraordinarily inexpensive in a levee-protected area). This response,
entirely foreseeable, led to disaster when the levee at the 17th Street Canal ruptured, inundating
thousands of homes.
70. A recent paper describes the practice among U.K. mortgage lenders to arrange "block policies" with preferred insurers that commit the insurer to underwrite flood risk for any property referred
to it. However, this system has recently been subjected to "proverse selection," in which good risks are
enticed by nonparticipating flood insurers. David Crichton, Flood Risk and Insurance in England and
Wales: Are There Lessons to Be Learned from Scotland? (Benfield Hazard Research Centre, Technical
Paper No. 1, 2005), available at http://www.benfieldhrc.org/activities/tech-papers/tech-paperl/floodrisk-and-insMar05.pdf.
During a workshop presentation, a questioner suggested that the problem of noncompliance could
be addressed by requiring proof of flood insurance (where needed) as a condition of participation in the
secondary market. This idea has the attractiveness of delegating regulatory oversight to what ought to
be a risk-sensitive entity-Fannie Mae. In fact, mortgages purchased by Fannie Mae are subject to the
1973 legislation requiring federally regulated lenders to ensure coverage for flood-prone properties.
See DIXON ET AL., supra note 27, at 1. However, one must recall that insurance does not "run with the
land," and mortgage obligations have a life of their own. This mechanism thus cannot ensure that, once
securitized, risky mortgages remain insured against flood.
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IV.

SOCIALIZING LOSSES, PRIVATIZING PROFITS

Private insurance markets tend to externalize costs at the expense of a
robust system of loss redistribution. Birny Birnbaum has evocatively
described the "hollow[ing] out" of private insurance policies;7 insurers
have excluded losses that would have been covered in earlier years (such as
earthquakes, floods, hail, and windstorm). I have observed elsewhere that
insurance law has yet to work out a completely satisfactory theory that
defines the conditions when insurers may validly exclude certain events
from coverage, yet avoid the label Birnbaum believes already describes
homeowners insurance: "defective products."
That theory must await another day, but it is important to outline the
present dynamics as they relate to flood insurance. Insurers believe that
they have insulated themselves from flood losses; I believe they are
mistaken.
A.

The Insurance Construction Cycle

"The insurer proposes, but the court disposes." Such was the view
within the insurance industry a century ago, and little has changed to alter
this fact. Insurance contracts have always been subject to interpretation
and revision; early insurance contracts were astoundingly vague, often to
the detriment of insurers. Through redrafting, insurers learned to more
carefully define the scope of risks they understood the contract to allocate
to them. However, insurance language evolves over a very long time; there
are significant transaction costs involved in revising policies. An insurer
with a bright idea for a more finely tailored provision may be unwilling to
risk the possibility that it will have guessed incorrectly, thus saddling itself
with more liability than its conservative competitors. For this reason, the
development of policy forms has largely been centralized within the Insurance Services Office ("ISO").
Exclusions are not limited, however, to more precise statements of
what the insurance is. Insurers have demonstrated a rather consistent tendency to seek exclusion for unpleasant casualties that would ordinarily be
understood to fall within the scope of coverage. Like many things, this
dynamic has both an innocent and a sinister interpretation. The sinister
view is that insurers are merely "hollowing out" coverage whenever they
get the chance, thus depriving consumers of some irreducible minimum
level of fair protection. Examples that have particular resonance today, as
we shall see, were the practices of excluding from accident coverage any
events in which disease played a role or accidents occasioned by the insured's negligence. A moment of reflection will disclose to the reader that
there are many such cases, yet they are events for which consumers reasonably expect coverage.
71. See Letter from Birny Birnbaum, Executive Dir., Ctr. for Econ. Justice to David Parsons,
Deputy Comm'r, State of Ala. Dep't of Ins., Proposal for NAIC Personal Lines Regulatory Framework
(July 14, 2006) (on file with the Mississippi College Law Review).
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Insurance Risk Allocation and Market Segmentation

Consider the sudden emergence of mold exclusions in the 1990s. At
one point, insurers were paying $3 billion annually for mold claims (which
were quite novel).7 2 Allocating the risk of legal claim uncertainty-the possibility that notions of "damages" or "wrongs" will evolve somewhat faster
than insurance contracts-poses a difficult problem. The insurance contract may profitably be understood as allocating these "meta-risks" as well
as the obvious risks, though this tests the contract-based underpinnings of
classical insurance law. Depriving homeowners of mold coverage simply
because insurers (who are in a superior position to monitor patterns of
claiming and liability) did not foresee such claims is problematic.
However, it is less so when exclusions take on a market-segmenting
character. Market-segmenting provisions are designed to force consumers
to purchase insurance specifically tailored to events with patterns or risk
profiles that distinguish them from the basic insurance policy. Two wellknown examples are product liability claims (generally excluded by the
standard commercial general liability policy) and automobile claims (generally excluded by the standard homeowners policy). These liabilities are
ratably distinct from the sorts of claims to which homeowners and businesses are typically subject. To avoid adverse selection, insurers properly
exclude them from coverage, leaving it to the policyholder to seek separate
coverage- perhaps from the same insurer-such as completed-products
coverage or automobile insurance.
Market segmentation works well when there exist clear factual and
legal borders between different types of claims. Moreover, this border
must be described with precision. Otherwise, consumers may characterize
their claims for purposes of maximizing insurance coverage for a particular
event as it occurs. Just as importantly, consumers may be genuinely perplexed about precisely what coverage they have purchased.
Market segmentation has in practice proven difficult, particularly in
the homeowners context. Homeowners policies are particularly susceptible
to policyholder arbitrage because they offer several different kinds of coverage for types of losses that often share a common nucleus of operative
facts. Insurers use several strategies to discipline the claim construction
process, but for over a century they have relied on various policy conditions addressing causation. This process reached its conclusion with the
evolution of anti-concurrent causation ("ACC") clauses. By their terms,
ACC clauses exclude coverage where a non-covered peril contributes in
some way to the loss. The concept is not new; insurers have used similar
phrases since the nineteenth century. However, a series of decisions during
the 1980s in California and Washington put pressure on insurers to describe
with particularity their intent to opt out of what emerged as a default rule
of interpretation: If there is a covered cause, there is some coverage-and
72. ROBERT HARTWIG & CLAIRE WILKINSON, MOLD AND INSURANCE 3
available at http://server.iii.org/yy-obj-databinary/735870_1.OMold.pdf.
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potentially, a great deal of it-notwithstanding the presence of uncovered
causes. 73 ACC clauses were written to deal with this problem, but instead
demonstrate that it is possible to fail by succeeding too well.
In a future article, I will explore more fully the role that causation has
played in the interpretation of insurance contracts. For present purposes,
the issue may usefully be explored by examining the set of cases pending in
Mississippi in the wake of Katrina.
C. Anti-Concurrent Causation
Insurers either use an ISO-derived ACC clause or devise their own.
Although some policies are more specific with respect to excluded perils,
the variation among ACC clauses themselves is generally not material.
State Farm's Mississippi homeowners form provides, in relevant part:
We do not insure under any coverage for any loss which
would not have occurred in the absence of one or more of
the following events. We do not insure for such loss regardless of: (a) the cause of the excluded event; or (b) other
causes of the excluded event; or (c) whether other causes
acted concurrently or in any sequence with the excluded
event to produce the loss ... [.]74
This point is amplified and given more precise instantiation with respect to water damage in the standard homeowners policy, as well as the
windstorm policy which is a separate coverage in Mississippi and some
other southern states. Other provisions commonly found among ISO policies and their variants reinforce this idea. Read literally, the clause eliminates coverage wherever water acts alongside a covered peril such as wind.
Unsurprisingly, the leading authorities emerging from Hurricane Katrina
decline to do so.
In gracious correspondence with the author, one of the drafters of the
ACC (a senior officer with State Farm) pointed out that it has been widely
upheld. State Farm and other insurers have made the same claim in briefs
filed throughout the Katrina litigation. While true, this overlooks the particular evil the ACC was designed to eliminate: The judicially-created uncertainty regarding the border between earth movement and other perils
such as explosion or negligent construction. 7 An insurer undertakes to
cover explosions due to earthquake (such as a ruptured gas main) because
it would be patently ridiculous to describe a house consumed by fire as not
having been lost due to fire simply because the fire was antecedently
caused by an excluded peril. The problem arose when courts construed
73. Stephen P. Pate, Recent Developments in Property Insurance Law, 33 TORT & INS. L.J. 659,
663 (1998).
74. Thepker v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 1:05CV475, 2006 WL 1442489, at *2 (S.D. Miss.
May 24, 2006).
75. See, e.g., Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 P.2d 704 (Cal. 1989); Graham v. Pub.
Employees Mut. Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 1077 (Wash. 1983).
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"explosion" to refer to the underlying earth movement itself, an act of judicial sophistry that has few parallels. No one but. a homeowner lacking
earthquake insurance would think to describe such a loss as a covered "explosion" as that term is conventionally understood. It is unsurprising that
many of the cases upholding the ACC-upholding the right of the insurer
to specify coverage defined outside of the general rule of proximate causation-have in fact arisen in the context of earth movement.
In the Katrina cases, the issue is more complicated. Hurricane Katrina
resulted in several distinct types of losses, not all of which, it appears, can
be reliably distinguished after the fact. A rough taxonomy of catastrophe
would include: Homes apparently washed away by the surge of the Gulf
Coast or nearby bodies of water; homes damaged by such surges, then destroyed by hurricane winds; homes damaged by hurricane winds, then destroyed by flooding; and homes destroyed entirely by flood. This taxonomy
does not lend itself to the market-segmenting function of the ACC because
two of its categories are highly indeterminate. Moreover, if the insurance
industry's interpretation is correct, there is no insuranceproduct available
for losses caused partially by flood and partly by wind.76
D. Judicial Regulation of Insurance Products

Of course, these observations merely provide an interpretive backdrop
for the resolution of insurance disputes. This resolution reflects the continuing tension within insurance law between a tort theory of interpretation
(roughly analogous to consumer-friendly strict liability law) and a contract
theory (akin to warranties and meaningful bargaining).
If an insurance provision is clear, courts will accord it its natural meaning. Very few provisions, however, cannot be made to appear ambiguous
given unusual facts and creative lawyering. At this point, several avenues
present themselves. Interpretive canons may lend clarity to what is merely
a complex, though not necessarily ambiguous, provision. In an ordinary
contract, evidence of the parties' apparent intentions is often available. Insurance contracts, however, are classic adhesion contracts: The intentions
of the policyholder, if extant, play almost no role whatsoever in the drafting
of policy provisions.77
To an extent unimaginable in other areas of contract law, courts are
highly sensitive to insurance policy ambiguity. Thus, the seemingly conventional doctrine of contra proferentem plays an outsized role in insurance
disputes; more often than elsewhere, insurance contract language emerges
76. For reasons discussed below, the National Flood Insurance Program is not designed to be
accommodating on matters of causation. It only covers certain types of flood losses.
77. Because insurance provisions are highly standardized and typically submitted to state regulators for approval, there exists the potential to look to drafting or administrative history to inform judicial interpretation. However, this is typically confined to the provisions recognized as controversial at
the time of their inception and in no event provides as much guidance as the context-dependent
processes of case-by-case adjudication.
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as ambiguous.7 8 This essentially proceduralist tool has attained a substantive gloss in the form of the reasonable expectations doctrine. It is at this
point that the product-liability law conception of insurance law begins to
take shape.
Contracts do not have an existence divorced entirely from the expectations and understandings that exist external to them. Indeed, it is precisely
such expectations that often induce people to enter into contracts in the
first place. An insurance consumer seeks protection from a set of hazards,
the precise instantiation of which may be but dimly perceived. Alternatively, the consumer may have very specific hazards in mind, but they may
have an imperfect correspondence with the coverage the market ordinarily
provides. In theory, proper marketing and negotiation can correctly "reset" either those expectations or the insurance policy itself; in reality, consumers do little to educate themselves about their policies, and most
insurer-side communication is either commercial or opaque in nature. Into
this most yawning of contractual gaps, courts have stepped in-first gingerly, then decisively-to assert the independent meaning of insurance
contract language.
The reasonable expectations of the policyholder come into play in two
distinct ways. First, they can lend ambiguity to terms not otherwise unclear. Among a range of potential meanings for a given term, consumers
may ascribe one above others which subtly bends the light reflected from
the term toward indeterminacy. More directly, reasonable expectations
can defeat even unambiguous language that a "painstaking" review would
reveal as affording no coverage. In effect, this "strong" form of the expectations principle is analogous to a finding of product defectiveness (the
product at hand being an insurance policy that fails to operate as a consumer might expect). 79 In either form, consumers' expectations exert a
gravitational effect on the construction of insurance contracts.
E.

The Katrina Cases

As of February 2007, there were approximately 1000 cases pending
before Judge Senter of United States District Court for the Southern
78. One reason for this is that insurance policies have a necessarily contingent relationship with
the external world. Despite well-known similarities between ship names, and the mysteries of chicken,
most contract disputes arise internally over the contested meanings within the four corners of the document itself. Insurance-triggering events, by contrast, invariably involve causes and phenomena outside
of the contract, but-ideally-correctly described by the contract. Although insurers strive to describe
the external world with ever-greater (and more complex) precision, the race against "the bottomlesscup chain of events" has proven unwinnable. Thus, insurers seek to design language, wherever possible,
to pretermit dispute.
79. Unsurprisingly, the reasonable expectations doctrine has an exact counterpart in products
liability law- the "consumer expectations test." And, just as the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability abandons the two-pronged chimera created by § 402A of the Restatement (Second) in
favor of a "reasonableness" test that comprehends both the contract and tort component of a product
liability claim, so too would a "negligent drafting" test explain most extracontractual results in insurance disputes. However, courts construing insurance contracts tend to invoke negligence language only
indirectly. See Kenneth S. Abraham, A Theory of Insurance Policy Interpretation, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 531,
534 (1996).
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District of Mississippi." ° Hundreds of other cases have been filed in Mississippi state courts and courts throughout Louisiana and Texas for damages
arising from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The relevant policies in these
states vary slightly from insurer to insurer, and Mississippi homeowners
purchase separate windstorm coverage (though usually from their homeowners insurer). However, the essential differences are minor, and should
not obscure the policy issue before these several courts: Does the flood
exclusion deprive homeowners of coverage for losses caused partially by
wind, and partly by flood? In a trio of rulings, Judge Senter set the terms
of debate for the cases before him; they are likely to prove highly influential elsewhere.
In Tuepker v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,1 Judge Senter considered the effects of an ACC clause given the restrictive reading of exclusions
generally and Mississippi's law regarding insurance causation. Insurance
language is construed asymmetrically, depending on the function of the
term in question. Grants of coverage are construed broadly, while exclusions are construed narrowly. Thus, the phrase "arising out of," which can
appear in several places within an insurance policy, does not have a stable
meaning ensuring an even, clear border between seemingly identical policy
provisions.
State Farm's policy sprinkles references to exclusion throughout but
contains most every imaginable limitation of liability for mixed-cause
events:
We do not insure under any coverage for any loss consisting
of one or more of the items listed below. Further, we do not
insure for loss described in paragraphs 1. and 2. immediately
above regardless of whether one or more of the following:
(a) directly or indirectly cause, contribute to or aggravate
the loss; or (b) occur before, at the same time, or after the
loss or any other cause of the loss[.]12
The excluded causes listed in the policy include flood and its many variants.

80. As this Article was going to press, attorneys representing Mississippi policyholders (for
whom I consulted in this matter) and State Farm announced a tentative settlement of 639 cases. Joseph
B. Treaster, State Farm Negotiating Gulf Claims Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2007, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2007/01/08[business/08cnd-insure.html?ex=1325912400&en=3e2ed478d41l6c52&ei=
5089&partner=rssyahoo&emc=rss.
81. No. 1:05CV475, 2006 WL 1442489 (S.D. Miss. May 24, 2006).
82. Id. at *2. Two terms within the full exclusion dispose of the argument that "storm surge" is
impliedly saved from exclusion as a species of mixed-cause loss (as storm surge is caused by the direct
and indirect action of wind upon a body of water). First, the exclusion includes water "whether driven
by wind or not" (which is itself subject to a different exception). Second, it includes "seiche," which
sounds like a Creole delicacy but actually means "an occasional and sudden oscillation of the water of a
lake, bay, estuary, etc., producing fluctuations in the water level and caused by wind, earthquakes,
changes in barometric pressure, etc." Dictionary.com, seiche - Definitions from Dictionary.com, http://
dictionary.reference.com/browse/seiche (last visited Jan. 30, 2007).
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Judge Senter identified two bases of ambiguity.8 3 Beginning the early

1990s, insurers began offering (sometimes exclusively) windstorm policies
with deductibles for hurricane-related losses. Hurricanes are principally
windstorms; excluding coverage for wind-related hurricane losses simply
because flood losses occur as well is difficult to reconcile with the popular
understanding of "hurricane."84 In light of this, Judge Senter found the
policies excluding language relating to "weather conditions" (an overly
complicated locution that essentially recapitulates the ACC clause) unenforceable to the extent they purported to preclude coverage for any wind
losses because of any causally related flood loss.8 5
However, not all policies have hurricane deductibles, and this was a
secondary rationale.86 Judge Senter's primary rationale was that excluding

"inseparable" mixed-cause losses was an unrealistic construction in the
context of a hurricane.8 7 This reading is supported by a line of Mississippi
cases predating the modern ACC clause but which similarly allocated to
the insurer the burden of disaggregating the excluded flood from covered
wind losses.8 8
Judge Senter reiterated this ruling in Guice v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,89 another mixed-cause case. The plaintiff in Guice argued that

because there was some wind damage (undeniable), State Farm was necessarily obligated to pay for the entire loss, the various exclusions notwithstanding.9" Tuepker, however, correctly forecloses this argument.
In response, State Farm had the option of sounding reasonable. Judge
Senter had already rejected the argument that storm surge flooding was not
"flooding" excluded by the standard policy. 91 As a bench trial would
shortly reveal, Judge Senter set blind sympathy to one side and received
highly contestable and complicated meteorological and engineering evidence fairly and without prejudice. Although nearly all homeowners insur-

ance policies contain some variation of the ACC language, insurers
83. Tuepker, 2006 WL 1442489, at *4.
84. Relatedly, several policyholders and the Attorney General of Mississippi have argued that to
the extent windstorm policies were marketed as "hurricane" policies or advertised as protection from
"hurricanes," Gulf Coast policyholders would reasonably expect coverage for the other prominent feature of hurricanes-high waters. In isolation, this is a plausible argument; that is, consumers might very
well expect the term "hurricane" to encompass the set of catastrophic risks that words such as "Katrina" have imprinted indelibly on public consciousness. The problem is that the term does not appear
in isolation but is surrounded by language that clearly directs the consumer to look elsewhere for flood
coverage. More importantly, that coverage is in fact available, and consumers often receive specific
notice about it. Finally, although the term "flood" unsurprisingly turns out to have some counterintuitive meanings in the insurance context, it is difficult to imagine that these meanings would not encompass many of the losses experienced during Katrina. Judge Senter has ruled that "storm surge" flooding
is just that-flooding-and is thus excluded from the policy. Id. at *3-4. The Mississippi Attorney
General's suit is pending, but as this Article went to press, it seemed headed for settlement.
85. Id. at *4.
86. Id. at *5.
87. Id. at *4.
88. See id. at *3 (collecting Mississippi cases).
89. No. 1:06CV1-LTS-RHW, 2006 WL 2359474 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 14, 2006).
90. Id. at *3.
91. Id. at *4 (citing Tuepker, 2006 WL 1442489, at *6).
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themselves rarely accord it its literal meaning to deny coverage altogether.
But State Farm, in a further confirmation of the supreme unwisdom of constitutional remittitur, 92 elected not to be reasonable; it claimed that because an excluded cause contributed
to an "inseparable" loss, coverage for
93
windstorm was eliminated.
Judge Senter aptly described the posture of the case:
Thus, while the Plaintiff and State Farm have focused on
diametrically opposed interpretations of the policy language

in an attempt to position themselves to gain instant victory,
the fact remains that there are disputed issues that will determine the scope of coverage under this policy ....

[i]t is

my opinion, upon a thorough review of the terms of the
State Farm policy, that the damage attributable to wind and
rain will be covered, regardless of whether an inflow of
water caused additional damage that would be excluded
from coverage.9 4

In addition to denying State Farm's motion to dismiss, Judge Senter
refused to certify a class action, precisely because of the wide spectrum of
contested facts likely to be found among the claims of the putative class
members.9 5
Finally, Judge Senter applied these holdings in Leonard v. Nationwide
Mutual Insurance Co. 9 6 The Leonard case was a bench trial, which reflected an unusual strategy on the part of the plaintiffs of focusing precisely

on the meaning of Judge Senter's rulings. Although the short-term result
was undoubtedly disappointing for the plaintiffs, the strategy was correct.
The Leonards suffered significant losses when their home was inundated by a wall of water seventeen feet deep.9 7 The home sat just over 500
feet from a lakeshore, and the deluge was caused by storm surge.9 8 Judge

Senter dismissed without much elaboration their claim that storm surge
92. See State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
93. Guice, 2006 WL 2359474, at *3.
94. Id.
95. Id. at *5.
96. 438 F. Supp. 2d 684 (S.D. Miss. 2006).
97. Id. at 689.
98. The Leonards' insurance agent, consistent with his practice, advised the couple that they did
not need flood insurance. This was extremely poor advice. Because their home was outside of the area
of maximum risk, flood insurance was available at exceptionally low cost, reflecting the diminished risk.
Assuming that the relevant flood map was accurate, the chance of flooding it describes is correct only
with respect to the perimeter of the floodplain. If one imagines a circle describing a slightly depressed
"bowl," the rim of the bowl is the area expected to flood once every 100 years. However, the center of
the bowl may flood much more often: Similarly, a concentric circle imagined around the bowl may be a
"200-year-floodplain," but an area just outside of the inner bowl may present a risk nearly identical to
one just inside it. It is unlikely that the Leonards' insurance agent understood this, a failing that will no
doubt be explored in the ongoing wave of claims for negligent insurance broking. It also appears that
FEMA does not understand this, as "a large share of [repetitively-flooded properties] are classified as
being outside the designated 100-year floodplain, which raises concerns about the accuracy of flood
insurance maps ....
King, supra note 7, at CRS-22.
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was wind-driven and thus not excluded, pointedly noting that the Leonards
had specifically declined to purchase flood insurance.99 Reiterating his ruling in Tuepker, Judge Senter determined that although mixed-cause events
must be sifted through the burden-shifting analysis described above, State
Farm had convincingly demonstrated that the Leonard home had been substantially damaged by flood before there was any wind damage.1 00 The
comparatively trivial wind damage was not excluded by virtue of its causal
concurrence with other flood damage.1 ' The Leonards thus recovered but
a small fraction of their losses-those attributable to wind. 0 2
At the time of this writing, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit has accepted Tuepker for interlocutory appeal. Although few
endeavors are more unavailing than predicting the rulings of life-tenured
judges, it is unlikely that this ruling will be reversed. However, it may be
affirmed on grounds slightly different than those offered by Judge Senter,
though consonant therewith: The anti-concurrent causation language is not
unenforceable because it is ambiguous; it is unenforceable because it is not.
V.

THE LIMITS OF CAUSAL EXCLUSIONS

The ACC was born not solely out of farcically creative judicial interpretation, but also from an unrealistic modesty about the judicial function
in insurance contracts. Interpretive canons such as contra proferentem
permit courts to conceal genuine substantive disapproval under a veneer of
procedural irregularity. Courts construing insurance contracts are sensitive
that they not appear unduly "activist." Substituting the meaning the parties evidently intended for the one actually conveyed is hardly activism; it is
merely construction.
Unfortunately, the reticence to acknowledge the growing substantive
character of judicial insurance regulation' 013 led to a dynamic that may be
observed across a spectrum of insurance disputes. Courts detect what may
or may not be a genuine ambiguity and resolve it in favor of coverage. In
time, insurers assimilate these teachings into revised policy language,
thereby accomplishing the same purpose but with greater clarity. However, the judiciary, sensitized by now to the peculiar dispute, again rejects
99. Leonard, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 691.
100. Id. at 695.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 696.
103. Judicial regulation of insurance is an adjunct to administrative regulation. There has
emerged recently a debate uncannily similar to the debate within tort law over judicial versus regulatory supremacy. Insurers, and some regulators, suggest that the regulatory approval typically required
to market insurance policies ought to provide an imprimatur of sorts, beyond which courts might hesitate to venture. This entirely misperceives the function and competence of state regulators, who are
typically overmatched by insurers with respect to technical expertise and resources. There is virtually
no insurance policy in use that, although approved, has not been subject to significant judicial qualification and emendation. Courts were interpreting insurance contracts for centuries before the first state
department of insurance existed, and state regulators have shown no detectable enthusiasm for significantly withdrawing, by interpretive guideline or otherwise, the role that courts play in resolving insurance disputes. Whether some hypothetical ideal regulator ought to be preferred to the distributed and
dynamic processes of common law regulation is a question left for another day.
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the proffered language as being insufficiently specific. All the while, the
insurance claim assertedly shrouded in ambiguity slowly acquires the coloring of an insurance "right"-an irreducible minimum below which no reasonable insurance policy should fall. In time, the insurer will perfect the
disputed language so that no one could reasonably misconstrue it. By that
point, however, the war may be over and the court ready to rest judgment
on its perception of what an insurance policy should contain. As Michelle
Boardman evocatively puts the matter, at some point courts effectively declare that the insurance language is "theirs." 1 °4
This dialectic is unhelpful, for it conceals the true motives of judicial
action and offers insurers the false promise that clarity-and clarity
alone-is all that is needed to rescue their preferred construction. While
insurance law may be retreating at present into a formalist redoubt, such
epicyclical dynamics should not obscure this as a longstanding feature of
insurance law. For at least 150 years-since the first personal contracts of
insurance were available-courts have declined to condone interpretations
that afford insureds merely the illusion of coverage.
In this sense, Judge Senter's conclusions in Tuepker, et al., are unduly
restrained, with one possible exception. The various expressions of the
ACC clause are not semantically ambiguous. The intent-more obvious to
a drafter, though surely not the layman-is to except the construction of
homeowners policies from the tangled skein of causation rules which courts
in Mississippi and elsewhere have developed to resolve mixed-cause cases.
But two interrelated problems have generally acted to frustrate what might
otherwise be regarded as a reasonable re-allocation of risk.
If hard cases make bad law, it is surely true that bad law begets worse
insurance language. The drafters of the ACC at best made the mistake of
taking several foolish courts at their word, although the relevant exclusions
were clear enough for courts acting in good faith to resolve those cases in
the insurers' favor. The definitional function of the ACC (articulating that
an excluded event retains this character even when other events concur to
cause a loss) is unremarkable. What is remarkable is the effort by some
insurers to imbue it with the capacity to also remove covered events from
coverage. The aggressively literal interpretation of the ACC clause, exemplified by State Farm's arguments in Tuepker, is that covered events are to
be deprived of this character when the loss is not easily separable from an
uncovered event. Thus, if a house suffers an explosion and collapses due to
the synergistic effects of a windstorm and flooding, there is no coverage
10 5
whatsoever-even though three of these four phenomena are covered.
104. Michelle Boardman, Remarks at Panel Discussion, AALS Section on Insurance Law, Washington, D.C. (2006).
105. Interestingly, the one potential semantic ambiguity revealed by this sequence under the ACC
is the precise meaning of the term "loss" as in "loss from water damage." Water, in this example, was a
necessary but not sufficient cause of the entire loss. Thus, "the loss" would be excluded. Alternatively,
the excluded loss could mean only that portion of the loss attributable to excluded causes. Applying
contra proferentem on this basis would yield the same result reached by Judge Senter. Alternatively,
one could resuscitate this interpretation by claiming that it merely reflects the parties' intent to contract
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This is a remarkable argument, one that significantly overshoots its
reasonably intended target. It channels the factual question of allocation
into the legal question of mixed causation. This feature is no accident, as
insurers would prefer to avoid epistemologically-fraught issues because
such questions cannot reliably be resolved in their favor. If one assumes a
random distribution between wind and water causes of loss, there will be
some wind damage 99% of the time. The aggressive construction of the
ACC would deny coverage 100% of the time. Thus, the basis for Richard
Scruggs's seeming caricature of the insurer argument: "If there's even one
drop of water, there's no coverage. ' 10 6 Modify this statement only slightly
overall damage and it is an
to specify that the water must contribute to the
07
accurate summary of State Farm's position.'
Ambiguity is not the problem. Illusory coverage is. How can a windstorm policy sold along the hurricane-prone Gulf Coast exclude hurricanerelated windstorm losses? Certainly the hypothetical reasonable policyholder would expect such coverage. Without it, the standard homeowners
or windstorm policy would indeed be a defective "product." Most spectacularly, this construction would mean that no homeowner would have any
coverage for mixed-cause losses because government flood insurance is unusually restrictive. Thus, the prudent consumer who purchases a package
of homeowners, windstorm, and flood coverage would, despite this apparhave none at all. By any yardent embarrassment of insurance, actually
10 8
stick, this is an unconscionable result.
In the Leonard case, Judge Senter added a substantive gloss to his
Tuepker ruling. Nationwide, despite having substantially identical language, declined to assert the aggressive interpretation of the ACC
clause.' 0 9 After reciting pre-ACC Mississippi cases that reached the same
conclusion, Judge Senter observed that such a reading (if uncovered causes
contribute in any way, there is no coverage)
out of the rules of proximate causation. However, this is a little like trying to contract out of the laws of
gravity. Proximate causation (whether misleadingly denominated "efficient" or otherwise) is an unavoidable consequence of the need to define causal relationships in manageable ways. For over a century, courts have looked directly past "but-for" language to discern the true cause of events in insurance
disputes.
106. Richard Scruggs, Remarks at Insurance and Risk Allocation in America: Economics, Law,
and Regulation, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Law and Regulatory Studies (Sept. 2006).
107. Although State Farm conceded that separable wind damage would be covered (see, e.g., Leonard, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 693), in many cases (such as Tuepker v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., No.
1:05CV475, 2006 WL 1442489 (S.D. Miss. May 24, 2006) and Guice v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,
No. 1:06CV1-LTS-RHW, 2006 WL 2359474 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 14, 2006)) the damage attributable to wind
will not be self-evidently separable. But this does not mean that the losses are not susceptible to any
allocation whatsoever. Tort law has long managed passably well to allocate liability among tortfeasors
whose negligence concurs to create an indivisible injury.
108. As I indicated earlier, I never tire of explaining that unrealized insurance risks still have
substantial value; that the insurance function must necessarily balance competing and somewhat contradictory interests and constituencies; and that insurance companies are not (as most of my highly educated correspondents insist) "evil." These efforts, unstinting, are aided not at all by arguments such as
those advanced by State Farm here.
109. Leonard, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 694.
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would make the windstorm protection illusory for those
who live in areas where the risk of flooding is greatest. Nationwide seems to recognize this to be the reasonable interpretation of its policy. Nationwide has not invoked this
policy provision to deny coverage to the Leonards for what
everyone recognizes to be wind damage. °
The upshot of these rulings is that policyholders bear the burden of
establishing covered windstorm damage, but insurers have the burden of
proving the extent to which the loss is excludable due to flood. This is the
correct answer. However, the overall picture is unsatisfying from a policy
standpoint. To understand why, it is necessary to locate the law and function of the private insurance market alongside its public counterpart.

VI.

THE UNCERTAIN FRONTIER BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE

A.

Square Corners and Misshapen Law

The NFIP is governed by federal common law and the terms of the
Standard Flood Insurance Policy ("SFIP"), but administered largely by private insurers. This arrangement has more than a passing similarity to ERISA, in which private health insurers administer insurance contracts
governed by federal common law, while being underwritten entirely by employers. There are three principal drawbacks to this approach: Asymmetrical insurance law, asymmetrical insurance coverage, and unintended
arbitrage opportunities.
1. Asymmetrical Insurance Law
"Men must turn square corners when they deal with the Government,"
wrote Justice Holmes over eighty years ago."1 His advice neatly captures
the law's reticence to permit claims against the federal government in derogation of strict procedural requirements. Holmes wrote in the context of a
tax refund case, and courts have repeatedly confirmed that exceptions
within the tax code are a matter of legislative grace not easily expandable
by the equitable considerations courts routinely bring to bear on private
disputes.
Several concerns have been thought to underlie this unswerving commitment to procedural exactitude, but they center on the notion of the government as sovereign. As such, the government is free to define the
conditions (subject to limited constitutional controls) by which it dispenses
110. Id. It bears noting that Nationwide could afford to be generous in this case, as the amount of
damage provably caused by water and wind was quite low. However, the court and litigants surely
recognized that these early cases would set the tone for hundreds others before Judge Senter and would
likely be widely influential as the Katrina litigation unfolds. Yet another problem with this particular
construction of ACC provisions is that even a separable wind loss would be excluded if it occurred (as it
often would) at the same time as a distinct water-caused loss. Although I remain convinced that the
basic problem with the ACC is not ambiguity, the overly elaborate construction of these provisions is
self-defeating.
111. Rock Island, A. & L.R. Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 141, 143 (1920).
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benefits; moreover, judicial departures from these rules have been thought
to implicate quasi-separation of powers concerns, arrogating to the judiciary prerogatives constitutionally located in the executive or legislative
branches. 112 These rationales are not overpowering in their persuasiveness
but have become firmly entrenched during the past century. They are of
particular importance to the NFIP.
Drawing from the Supreme Court's 1944 ruling in FederalCrop Insurance Co. v. Merrill,1 3 courts analyzing claims under the NFIP have demanded strict procedural compliance before claims may be entertained.
These requirements materially distinguish flood insurance law from ordinary insurance law. Although the Clearfield Trust exception to Erie and
(later) the terms of the SFIP itself provide for the evolution of federal common law-a law that facially resembles state-created insurance law-federal courts are distinctly less generous with respect to their interpretations
in the SFIP context.
A review of thirty years of NFIP litigation discloses several patterns.
At the broadest level, NFIP litigation pretermits the cycle of drafting, interpretation, and redrafting that characterizes private insurance law. As
courts send (admittedly imprecise and often contradictory) signals as to
what constitutes acceptable and clear terms of insurance contracts, insurers
return to the drafting board and insurance contracts evolve. More subtly,
the process of evolution takes place precisely because there are consequences for mistaken guesses. A kind of "natural selection" shines judicial
favor upon fair and adequately specified terms and punishes others
through enforced desuetude. But NFIP litigation unfolds against the background of governmental immunity. Because so many cases are resolved in
the government's favor at the pretrial level (and the remaining cases are
heard by judges, not juries), the policy-shaping dynamic of common-law
adjudication is absent. Thus, NFIP law has evolved along an entirely different track than private insurance law; its evolution has been primitive
indeed.
For example, an astonishing number of litigated NFIP claims are dismissed for failure to comply with the sixty-day deadline for submitting a
proof of loss following a flood. While seemingly trivial, this phenomenon
actually illuminates the asymmetrical character of NFIP insurance law
rather well. Within sixty days of a loss, a claimant must file a sworn proof
attesting and itemizing the amount of loss. 1 14 Recall that private insurers
are the agents of the NFIP, just as they are agents of private insurance
companies. Sixty days is a remarkably short time in which to gather full
information, given that flooding is a highly correlated event. Adjusters,
112. A short treatment of this issue may be found in John F. Conway, Equitable Estoppel of the
Federal Government: An Application of the Proprietary Function Exception to the Traditional Rule, 55
FORDHAM L. REV. 707 (1987).
113. 332 U.S. 380 (1947).
114. FEMA, Standard Flood Insurance Policy VII (J)(4), at 13, available at http://www.fema.gov/
pdf/nfip/gppl27.pdf (last visited Jan. 18, 2007) [hereinafter SFIP].
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contractors, and building materials are in short supply after catastrophes
because floods usually impact hundreds if not thousands of homes at once.
Failure to account for such "demand surge" is an unfortunate aspect of a
federal policy designed to help people."' 5
Somewhat more disappointing is the quality of assistance often received. Policyholders typically rely on oral and written assurances from
their agents and adjusters regarding the sequence of steps to be followed in
claiming under the NFIP. Essentially, they are relying on these actors to
furnish the facts needed to complete a flood claim. In numerous instances,
claimants fail to meet the deadline because discussions with the apparently
responsible authorities are ongoing or the authorities have informed the
claimant that the matter is being tended to. Unfortunately, the SFIP is
extraordinarily clear that nothing less than a written waiver from the Fed116
eral Insurance Administrator suffices to relax any NFIP requirement.
Applying the concededly plain meaning of this provision, the majority
of courts have refused to estop the NFIP from denying coverage even in
cases of obviously reasonable and foreseeable reliance by consumers on
the assurance of their agents. This result is directly contrary to what would
occur in a private insurance context; although insurance contracts regularly
purport to withdraw from agents any power beyond referral to the home
office, a central characteristic of private insurance law is the doctrine of
apparent agency, notwithstanding such provisions. Indeed, one of the most
vexing problems private insurers face is that of disciplining agents who
have a well-documented propensity to sell out their principals. This conscious allocation of legal system error to insurers, as described above, is
one of the most salient features of insurance law. Very few, if any, private
insurers would succeed in avoiding waiver or estoppel merely by pointing
to the language of their contracts; indeed, such doctrines are needed precisely because of these provisions (and the simplistic notion that underlies
them). This dichotomy has been specifically recognized by courts which
nonetheless felt bound to the strict requirements of the NFIP. 117
115. See, e.g., King, supra note 7, at CRS-12 n.35 (observing that price data typically used by
adjusters do not account for the 25-50% increases which data publisher suggests should be employed
following major disasters).
116. SFIP, supra note 114, at 11.
117. "The elements of traditional estoppel are plainly present in this case. Had the Phelps purchased their flood insurance from a private carrier, there would be no doubt whatsoever that they could
have invoked the doctrine." Phelps v. FEMA, 785 F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir. 1986) (reluctantly concluding
that the Merrill doctrine barred the use of equitable waiver absent written waiver by the Federal Insurance Administrator).
There is also an interesting political science question that emerges here. My review of several
decades of NFIP cases discloses a fair number of apparent frauds, and it is common, in the private
insurance context, for insurers to rely on technical defenses where the evidence of fraud is lacking (but
convincing to a fair-minded insurer). This only explains a fraction of possible NFIP motives in these
cases. What is striking is the remarkable parsimony of actors who ought to be unconstrained by notions
of competition or profit. The equities of the typical (unsuccessful) waiver case are self-evident. While
it is easy to understand why a profit-making venture would tend to seize on any procedural lapse to
avoid payment of a meritorious claim, it is less clear why the NFIP, entirely underwritten by the Treasury-and not in the form of a direct subsidy-would display these same characteristics. To put the
point more directly, unlike a system of tax collection, the whole point of the NFIP is to pay flood claims
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Asymmetrical Coverage

The same qualities of ungenerous construction that govern procedural
issues also carry over into the substantive analysis of coverage under the
NFIP. Recall the importance of clear factual and legal borders in marketsegmenting exclusions. Ideally, the meaning of "flood" would be stable not
just across different insurance companies (it generally is) but across different types of insurance as well. That way, consumers can correctly assess
where one policy will end and another will take up the slack.
This is less than a matter of terminology than it appears; it is primarily
jurisdictional. In private insurance disputes, common law courts are able to
harmonize the interpretation of policies that share coverage borders (e.g.,
homeowners versus automobile) to ensure that the overall insurance picture has no unnecessary gaps and conforms to the reasonable expectations
of consumers. Essential to this process is that fact that courts control the
construction of both sides of the border, from interpretation to allocation.
The structure of the SFIP and litigation arising thereunder inhibit this.
I would like to illustrate this by touching briefly on an unusual aspect
of the NFIP's definition of flood. When a property is inundated for any
substantial amount of time, the recession of water often leaves the soil unstable. This instability or loss of consistency causes a condition of subsidence that can severely damage the foundation of the home. A priori, this
would seem to be a loss due to flood. Although one could fairly characterize it as a type of damage to the land or earth movement, private insurance
does not cover damage to land or earth movement; the standard policy
specifically excludes subsidence. These exclusions are not unreasonable in
light of their market-segmenting purpose. Astonishingly, however, the situation described is not covered by the NFIP, either. In relevant part, the
SFIP defines "flood" as including such subsidence only where it occurs
along a lake or body of water that is subject to unusually high water levels
(as in a flash flood or tidal surge). In other words, a home that suffers a
general condition of flooding that manifests as soil undermining is not
covered.
to people who have, in fact, purchased flood insurance. Reading the niggardly construction given in
most cases leaves one with the uneasy feeling that courts and the NFIP conceive of the program as a
kind of welfare system in which individuals should be thankful for whatever the state graciously provides. There is often very little appreciation that NFIP claimants are consumers, much like those in the
private market; the typical policyholder's premium is currently unsubsidized, and the NFIP is largely
self-funding. This misunderstanding has been the expressed position of the NFIP. See King, supra note
7, at CRS-11-12 (noting criticism of NFIP's practice of low claims payments and the Federal Insurance
Administration's explanation before Congress that policyholders were not entitled to restoration to
pre-flood status, but merely to some assistance to help them recover).
In sum, the institutional approach to litigation that Judge Senter wryly observed in the Katrina
cases is, if nothing else, understandable. The reticence of the NFIP is less so. It also bears noting that
many courts have somewhat credulously interpreted the modest percentage of NFIP recoveries allocable to private insurers as administrators (3.3%) as evidence that insurer-administrators have every incentive to treat flood claims generously. This assumption finds no support in the practices of WYO
insurers. See, e.g., id. at CRS-12-13 (describing lawsuit challenging unfair claims practices of WYO
carriers).
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Part of the problem is the uneasy and uncertain relationship the NFIP
has with erosion. Erosion is an inevitable force in certain communities, and
the original 1968 legislation excluded coverage for any erosion-related loss.
By a 1973 amendment, this exclusion was softened to except sudden or
unforeseeable erosive events from exclusion, denying coverage only where
the erosion was gradual and foreseeable."1 8 It is certainly debatable
whether insurance should be offered on anything other than a "fronting"
basis for losses that are simply a matter of time; however, it is clear that
policies have been sold under these conditions for losses that were highly
likely to be excluded under the SFIP. This type of illusory coverage would
not be countenanced by the private law of insurance interpretation. Moreover, it is likely (though not certain) that the exception for lake-adjacent
subsidence (particularly inasmuch as this situation presents a greater moral
hazard than non-adjacent subsidence) would not survive careful application of the reasonable expectations doctrine. In practice, however, that
doctrine is not available in litigation under the NFIP.
Although this particular exclusion does not implicate the wind/water
distinction in private insurance, it does put pressure on the "earth movement" exclusion-an exclusion that is interpreted under the distinctly consumer-oriented law governing private insurance disputes. In the next
section, I suggest the unhealthy dynamic these pressures create.
3.

Claims Arbitrage

There are three significant opportunities for claims arbitrage that,
while an unavoidable feature of any legal system, are enhanced by the imprecise borders between private and public insurance. Every actor in this
play has a strong incentive to shift losses to others, and the results are
unpleasant.
a. Insurers As Agents
A central problem in the law of insurance disputes is that of principalagent. At nearly every phase of the insurance transaction-marketing, negotiation, adjustment of losses, and settlement-insurers rely on intermediaries whose interests are not fully aligned with their own.
Particularly in view of courts' willingness to contrast the apparent or ostensible function of insurance contracts with their actual terms, there are very
few insurance disputes that do not in some way involve the principal-agent
problem. There is no reason to believe that this problem disappears when
insurance companies are the agents and the government is the principal;
indeed, it is likely much worse.
Because the WYO program relies on private insurers, it is likely that
most policyholders get coverage through the insurance agent who procures
their homeowners policy. In some cases, the agent is essentially a broker,
118. COMMITTEE ON COASTAL EROSION ZONE MANAGEMENT, MANAGING COASTAL EROSION
72-73 (Committee on Coastal Erosion Zone Management ed., National Academy Press 1990).
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and the policyholder is actually dealing with two separate insurers (or
three, in the states that have disaggregated windstorm coverage from
homeowners policies)-one of which is merely the "face" of a program
underwritten by the government. Where the private homeowners' insurer
and the flood insurance administrator are in fact the same company, the
insurer has an unusually attractive opportunity to recharacterize wind
losses as flood losses as it is the very entity tasked with investigating flood
claims for the government. 119
Relatedly, this incentive is equally present in the absence of flood insurance. The only difference is that the insurer is not as well-positioned to
"concede" liability on behalf of the federal government. Such behavior is
surely unconscionable, but the extent to which it occurs is unknown. This is
shortly to change. One of the most sensational strands of the Katrina litigation is the claim that State Farm and other insurers, along with the engineering firms they engaged to investigate claims, conspired to alter or
fabricate analyses so as to shift losses away from the insurers (i.e., toward
the category of "flood"). The particularity of these allegations is striking,
and their detailed explication is eagerly awaited by observers outside the
insurance industry. As it happens, one disaffected policyholder is United
States Senator Trent Lott, whose Pascagoula home was destroyed by Katrina. Senator Lott inserted a provision into a Homeland Security funding
bill to require the General Accounting Office to investigate the extent to
which insurers under the WYO program have "improperly attributed"
wind losses to the NFIP. l2 0
If these suspicions strike the fair-minded reader as being rather uncharitable, it is worth noting that these are precisely the kinds of sentiments
insurers harbor regarding their own policyholders. Again, much of the
modern insurance contract and underwriting is structured around prevention and mitigation of moral hazard. But this is nothing new. A century
ago, an insurance executive observed that "if the right hand is insured, and
the left is not, more often than not it is the right one that goes." Nothing in
the century since has detectably altered this perception, and there is little
reason to believe that only individuals are so tempted.
b.

Insurers As "Fiscal Agents"

A more speculative, though intriguing arbitrage opportunity lies with
the ability of insurer-administrators to test claims and interpretations under
the NFIP at zero financial risk. Insurance claims practices are governed by
a congeries of administrative, statutory, and judicial regulation. Simplifying greatly, this regulatory scheme imposes penalties on insurers who fail to
119. The same phenomenon is familiar to anyone who has shared a bag containing two or more
orders of french fries. It is difficult for the custodian of the bag to reliably withdraw fries solely from his
own order until he reaches home. Moreover, when delivery takes place, it is usually the case that a few
fries have found their way to common area of the bag. In few other cases is the doctrine of Pierson v.
Post more unhesitatingly asserted.
120. Sam Friedman, Lott Sics Feds on Katrina Insurers, NATIONAL UNDERWRITER, Oct. 12, 2006,
http://www.property-casualty.com/2006110/lott sics-feds-on-katrinainsu.html.

MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 26:3

investigate claims in a timely and reasonable manner or who employ claims
practices calculated to frustrate the resolution of meritorious claims. Such
practices are broadly proscribed as "bad faith" claims.
Because the NFIP is governed by federal common law, it would have
been natural for courts to borrow jurisprudence from the state law-based
claims practices to create a set of penalties to deter and punish unfair
claims practices. However, the federal government has not assented to
such common law rulemaking; as insurers are merely the fiscal agents of
the NFIP, courts have generally concluded that no extracontractual claims
may be sustained for cases of insurer-administrator misconduct.
The upshot is that when a WYO insurer dons its NFIP hat, not only is
it playing with someone else's money, it is playing by a set of rules entirely
different from those that govern its private insurance transactions. But
WYO insurers are, of course, repeat players in the business of adjusting
and litigating claims that will often involve many of the same issues. NFIP
immunity permits insurers to negotiate harder (to the point of unreasonableness) on rebuilding costs because there is no real penalty for doing so.
The incentive lies in the fact that WYO claims practices will help determine
what constitutes a reasonable (or at least plausible) claims practice outside
of the WYO context.
For example, House A and House B are both insured by WYO, Inc.
Both suffer extensive hurricane damage, but only House B carries flood
insurance. To the extent A's losses are covered, many of them will be the
kinds of losses and expenses that B will incur as well. The rational move is
for the insurer to negotiate B's flood claim first. By using as leverage the
fact that B can, at most, compel WYO to pay what it owes-with no hope
of extracontractual penalties-WYO should be able to negotiate lower
payments for the costs of rebuilding.12 1 This establishes a lower baseline
for what will be very similar damage claims brought against WYO by A
and B's private policy. Whether these non-NFIP claims are litigated or
merely adjusted privately, WYO has lowered its overall costs by placing a
bet that may not pay off but which it simply cannot lose. This incentive is
unacceptable.1 2 2

121. Obviously, a Valued Policy Law ("VPL") would deter this, but only in cases of total loss do
VPLs come into play. And Mississippi, for example, does not have a VPL that obviously applies to
windstorm claims.
122. Steve Kanstoroom, who might be described as a free-lance muckracker of the NFIP, reports
"low-balling" by private adjusters who wish to avoid setting precedents for non-flood claims. According to former Federal Insurance Administrator (and current consumer advocate) Robert Hunter, this
pattern may be traced to the 1970s. Review and Oversight of the National Flood Insurance Program:
Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Housing and Community Opportunity, 109th Cong. 150 (2005)
(written statement and report of Steven J. Kanstoroom, Pattern Recognition and Fraud Detection
Expert).
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c. JudicialArbitrage
Insurers are not the only self-interested actors. Policyholders similarly
have a great incentive to characterize losses as insured, rather than excluded. Of course, policyholders cannot enforce their preferred allocations
without judicial assistance. It is here that the bill for our system of fractured ownership over catastrophe risks begins to come due. And it is addressed to the insurance industry.
Leonard was a case with unusually decisive facts. Though the law that
emerges from the "Senter Trio" is correct and quite favorable to policyholders, the Leonard's claim was a rather inhospitable platform. Moreover, Leonard was a bench trial in which the court's findings could be
scrutinized and evaluated without speculation, if need be, on appeal. Insurers are unlikely to see many such successes going forward.
Recall that after a policyholder establishes wind as a cause of lossnot a terribly difficult proposition after a hurricane-it falls to the insurer
to establish the existence and extent of exclusion for flood. To the extent
the insurer is unable to establish a plausible allocation, the default conclusion will be total liability.' 2 3 To the extent that evidence does support a
plausible allocation, there is a substantial likelihood that juries will construe doubts against the insurer. Regrettably, juries are somewhat likely to
do this even in cases where the doubts are few.
Again, part of this dynamic is justified on the basis of insurance law's
implicit allocation (across a spectrum of disputes) of the risk of legal system
error to the insurer. This is as it should be, but that conclusion is more
satisfying when one imagines the errors to be relatively few. But the other
part of the dynamic is that judges and juries will undoubtedly understand
what the "right" answer is with respect to allocation questions. Realistically, there is a significant possibility that some combination of sympathy,

123. In 2004, a Florida appellate court concluded that Florida's VPL required full compensation
in the event that a covered peril contributed to a total property loss. Mierzwa v. Florida Windstorm
Underwriting Ass'n, 877 So. 2d 774, 778 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). This is an extremely novel interpretation of the VPL, whose original purpose may be analogized to incontestability statutes common to life
insurance that eliminate the insurer's right to challenge the validity of the policy after two years but do
not restrict the insurer's right to argue that the policy is inapplicable. The function of the VPL is not to
address questions of allocation (the segregative function described above), but rather to prevent the
insurer from engaging in post-claim underwriting by contesting the value of the property it has agreed
to insure for a stated value.
Reaction to Mierzwa was swift and hostile, owing in part to the series of hurricane losses Florida
insurers had experienced that year. The Florida legislature subsequently amended the VPL to clarify
that uncovered losses did not become covered simply because the insurer was pre-committed to a stated
valuation. Significantly, the burden of establishing the uncovered causal contribution was explicitly
allocated to insurers: If the evidence does not permit allocation between covered and uncovered causes,
the insurer is liable for the entire VPL amount. FLA. STAT. § 627.702(1) (2003). To date, only one
other Florida appeals court, in Fla. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Cox, has followed Mierzwa; an excellent analysis of the proper relationship between valued policy laws and causation may be found in the
dissenting opinion. No. 1D05-4111, 2006 WL 3024902 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2006) (Polston, J.,
dissenting).
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empathy (for jurors will themselves be drawn from storm-ravaged communities), and antipathy toward insurance companies will systematically distort causation verdicts away from the abstractly correct, though practically
unobservable, allocation. In view of the wide range of constituencies that
will be impacted thereby, this result is unsatisfying.

It does, however, provide insight (unlikely to be candidly acknowledged) into State Farm's strategy of aggressively interpreting the ACC
clause. Just as the legal border between wind and water cannot reliably be
policed by causation language, the factual border between these causes
cannot reliably be expected to emerge from case-by-case adjudication.
Moreover, one cannot overstate the contested nature of the evidence most
cases are likely to present. Reasonable juries will be presented evidence
that will plausibly sustain verdicts in either direction, and appellate courts
are unlikely to have greater insights upon review. Insurers certainly will
not lose every case in front of hometown juries; however, they will tend to
lose more than would be the case in a perfectly functioning system. Perfection, alas, is generally an unavailable option. And it is absolutely unattainable within the present system of fractured ownership over hurricane losses.

VII.

THE CASE FOR CATASTROPHE

In this final section, I wish to draw upon the observations above and
outline the path to reform. Reform need not take place in a vacuum; many
European countries have addressed the problem of insuring catastrophic
risk. A survey of approaches suggests the full range of options and the
problems with each.124 Broadly speaking, choosing among divergent approaches to similar problems is to trade failures likely to occur under one
system with those failings thought politically feasible under another.
A fascinating study is the case of the United Kingdom. For over fifty
years, the U.K. approach has been to rely on private insurers to cover flood
risks. In return, the State provides for flood mitigation efforts to reduce
inand make more predictable insurers' burden. This longstanding (albeit1' 25
Agreement.'
Gentlemen's
"The
as
to
referred
is
formal) arrangement
This arrangement has come under strain in recent years, as a series of
floods exposed the Agreement's susceptibility to public moral hazard (public entities neglecting flood mitigation because the risk is insured) and the
diffuse responsibility for flood management among local and national authorities.1 2 6 These problems should be familiar to the attentive reader of
124. See U.S.

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-05-199, CATASTROPHE RISK: U.S. AND Eu-

32-38 (Feb. 2005), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05199.pdf (noting widespread adoption of public/private hybrid catastrophe risk plans throughout Europe, as well as prominent instances of no formal governmental role).
125. Michael Huber, Reforming the UK Flood Insurance Regime: The Breakdown of a Gentlemen's Agreement, ESRC Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation, Discussion Paper No. 18 (Jan.
2004), available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CARR/pdflDisspaperl8.pdf.
126. Huber, supra note 125, at 6-9. It is interesting to note that this is a variation on the phenomenon of "risk selection" identified by Jametti & von Ungern-Sternberg, supra note 16; only here, it is to
the private side of the public-private partnership that an increasing share of risk is left.
ROPEAN APPROACHES TO INSURE NATURAL AND TERRORISM RISKS
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the present Article. 12 7 Reform in the U.K. was instigated by insurers'
awareness of their exposure and of their need for control mechanisms
(such as price variation and the ability to withdraw from risky markets). In
turn, it is hoped that this system of indirect private governance will bring
direct public governance bodies (e.g.,
appropriate pressure to bear upon
128
local land use planning officials).
A.

The Business of Insurance Is Flood Insurance

In the United States, it is time for insurers to recognize that, despite
their efforts, they are similarly already in the business of providing flood
insurance. One of the effects of the NFIP is to "reclaim" what might otherwise be financially uninhabitable flood-prone areas. Not only are existing
communities sustained, but they are enhanced and new ones developed because the risk of disaster has been intermediated. From the perspective of
private insurance companies, this appears to be a positive development, as
it enhances the demand for their products. Homes that otherwise would
not be built or maintained require appropriate homeowners coverage. Prudence may also require appropriate flood insurance, yet the public-private
asymmetry continues here. As described earlier, many homes that ought to
have flood insurance do not, and many of those homes are privately insured. The result is that insurers' growth in high-risk areas comes at a substantial implied cost-the risk that when catastrophe strikes, the private
insurer will be the only available target.' 29 This risk is obviously greatest
with respect to coastal (rather than riverine) flooding.
127. Equally familiar is the German experience, where an estimated 3% of households were covered by optional private flood insurance at the time of 2002 floods that resulted in approximately $25
billion in damages. See Jennie James, Who's Going to Pay the Bill? Insurers May Have a Hard Time
Stumping Up Billions to Fix the Damage, TIME (EUROPE), Aug. 18, 2002; Mary Dejevsky, Floods:
Towns of Eastern Germany See New Prosperity Washed Away, THE INDEPENDENT (LONDON), Aug. 25,
2002. Unsurprisingly, the burden of the uninsured ultimately fell to the German government.
128. Huber, supra note 125, at 15-17. Huber draws an interesting political science lesson, namely
that the historic success of the Agreement rested on its essential opacity: It was politically sustainable
precisely because it concealed from public view the subsidies and moral hazard at play. Reform of the
Agreement unveils these processes (and substitutes new ones) in ways that may be economically desirable but politically problematic. Thus, Huber predicts, the Agreement is likely to dissolve over time.
Huber's suggestion does not appear to lead to inexorable unraveling of flood protection in the
U.K., but rather the explicit substitution of private regulation for a system of deregulation. It is clear,
however, that transparency changes the nature of catastrophic risk management policymaking. In light
of the seemingly inexhaustible capacity for political systems to defer problems to the future, this dynamic can only be regarded as salutary, even as it requires careful consideration of its consequences.
129. A vivid illustration of this was timely provided by a recent decision in the New Orleans
Katrina cases. Drawing a distinction between "artificial" and "natural" floods, U.S. District Judge
Stanwood Duval ruled that an undefined exclusion for "flood" could refer solely to natural flooding
and not to flood caused by defective levee construction. In re Katrina Canal Breaches, No. 05-4182,
2007 WL 121739 (E.D. La. Jan. 16, 2007). Thousands of policyholders (including Xavier University)
stand to collect as much as $1 billion or more as a result of this decision. The decision is incorrect, and
if left to stand will no doubt be remembered in New Orleans long after private insurers have fled the
market. See, e.g., Rebecca Mowbray, Commercial Insurer to Pull Out of Area: Businesses Fear Travelers' Move Will Put the Brakes on Recovery, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec. 2, 2006, at 1 (describing St.
Paul Travelers' plans to withdraw from New Orleans). Although this decision can and should be reversed, it does illustrate the pressures that will inevitably be brought to bear on private insurers active
in flood-prone areas. It appears that insurers have taken notice: "[I]nsurance companies say that when
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But because insurers' exposure to flood risk is somewhat opaque, they
may perceive little immediate self-interest in pushing for flood-mitigation
efforts. It is clear that communities and the federal government have failed
to police flood risk adequately, Katrina merely being a rather spectacular
example of a longstanding problem. I suggest that part of the solution to
this problem is to bring other interests into play. NFIP incentives are compromised and moderated by its inability to discipline wayward communities
and policyholders. Absent a more robust federal land use planning role
that seems plausible, some other mechanism must be found to govern flood
risk. That mechanism is the insurance market.
Consider the ways in which the structure of the NFIP inhibits optimal
flood risk mitigation. Currently, the NFIP relies on nearly 100,000 floodplain maps to determine risk and premium cost. 130 Upon this superstructure rest the development efforts of approximately 20,000 participating
communities. These maps first developed over thirty years ago, and they
were largely outdated or inaccurate even then because the baseline data
was already ten-to-twenty years old.131 The NFIP is slowly addressing this
problem, 3 2 but it should be no surprise that it has not acted more decisively. After all, there simply is no penalty to the NFIP for making a mistake. Because it has no real competitors,1 3 3 the NFIP has no incentive to
prioritize remapping (an extraordinarily costly and time-consuming process) over other, seemingly more urgent agency needs. As remapping is
likely to expand the number of households nominally required to obtain
what will be unsubsidized flood insurance, an agency sensitive to political
pressures may be disinclined to press vigorously.
Relatedly, NFIP actuarial projections and subsidies do not provide a
transparent picture of risk. NFIP's retrospective risk assessment tends to
mask the increasingly risky portfolio of policies in force (as has housing
price appreciation). Moreover, while the "grandfathering" subsidy is understandable, it does a poor job of communicating to high-risk insureds the
cost of ownership and fails to capture the criterion that would ordinarily be
most relevant for the provision of a subsidy-namely income.
Most importantly, private insurers (as well as banks and the secondary
mortgage market) do not perceive themselves as being directly threatened
by flood risk. Whereas windstorm insurers are at least active (if not always
there is a disaster that includes both wind and flood damage, they end up paying more on claims and
facing higher costs in litigation because policyholders who don't have enough flood coverage press
harder for money[.]" Id. The solution for that pressure is not more redrafting (the opinion is comically
unpersuasive in explaining why the State Farm ACC clause is sufficient to avoid responsibility, while
the ISO clause is not) but rather comprehension and management of flood risk by private insurers.
130. King, supra note 7, at CRS-8.
131. Flood Map Modernization and the Future of the National Flood Insurance Program:Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Community Opportunity, 109th Cong. 3 (2005) (testimony of
Michael Bullock, President, Intermap Federal Services, Inc.).
132. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-05-894T, FLOOD MAP MODERNIZATION:
FEMA's IMPLEMENTATION OF A NATIONAL STRATEGY (July 2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d05894t.pdf.
133. Flood insurance is available on a very limited basis from the private market.
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effective) 134 in the inevitable post-hurricane tightening of building codes,
only the NFIP is heard to urge that repetitively-flooded properties be elevated or floodplain development be redirected in the wake of a catastrophe. That signal is designed to be weak, and the results are predictable.
At the same time, the NFIP discourages what is admittedly not a particularly encouraging market for private flood insurance. It is unlikely that
private insurers could compete meaningfully with the NFIP, inasmuch as
the NFIP pays no taxes, generates no reserves, and is indifferent to losing
money. Yet the program fails in its basic mission to pre-fund flood losses.
Surely, the private market can do better.
B.

Toward a "Seamless Garment" of Insurance Coverage

I propose that flood risk be incorporated as a mandatory term into all
homeowners policies.1 35 Several steps are needed to complete this expansion of coverage. First, the federal government should underwrite the
134. One-quarter of the insured losses from Hurricane Andrew (at $22 billion, this figure is a
distant second to the mark set by Katrina) were attributable to Dade County's failure to enforce its own
building code. Burby, supra note 4, at 8. Even after Hurricane Katrina riveted the nation's attention on
the economic and social risks of natural disasters, Florida was back to business as usual. See Andres
Viglucci, Strict Building Codes Rejected, MIAMI HERALD, July 12, 2006 (describing Florida Building
Commission's decision to exclude, in the face of widespread concerns from insurers and others, the
Florida Panhandle from statewide windstorm code).
This dynamic is a familiar one that underscores the necessity and limits of relying on insurance as a
mechanism for governance. In theory, insurers should be relatively successful in persuading local communities to develop and enforce strong building codes, so as to mitigate insurers' losses. This prediction
does not rest on the intrinsic merits of tough building codes, but rather on the simple political fact that
few industries have as much lobbying power or make financial contributions comparable to insurers.
Across the domains of taxation, tort reform, and administrative regulation, the insurance industry is a
case study in the effective use of the political process by private interests.
That effectiveness does not extend to building codes; after nearly every hurricane, there are
promises to strengthen anemic regulations (which were largely overlooked in the first place). Why
insurers should be spectacularly unsuccessful in this domain is a question beyond the scope of this
Article, but there is room for some informed speculation. My suspicion is that, while insurers might
bring greater financial clout to the political bargaining table, there are many other actors who have
institutional advantages insurers cannot overcome.
Arrayed against the case for strong enforcement are developers and builders (who are relatively
wealthy and locally prominent) construction workers interested in maximizing employment, and potential purchasers, who in rapidly-appreciating markets such as Florida are more interested in increasing
the available housing stock than ensuring against natural hazards that easily fade in importance. Moreover, all of these actors are local; labor may organize membership against "anti-development" candidates and residents may vote with their feet to favor living in more "hospitable" communities than
those represented by the "anti-development" politician. On the other side of the aisle is an insurance
company that as a practical matter is not a substantial direct employer in the politician's state and is
only nominally a "constituent" thereof. A simple public choice model suggests that the local interests
will prevail in such a contest more often than not. This is in fact consistent with actual observation.
This Article's suggestion that natural hazards be more explicitly comprehended within private insurance may profitably be understood as an attempt to design a system that creates the greatest possible incentives for insurers to exercise their influence. As the example above suggests, there will remain
substantial political obstacles to the successful promulgation of private insurance governance in this
context, but continued reliance on insurers' partial and fragmented investment in land use regulation is
unlikely to prove more successful in the future than it has thus far.
135. This would require an explicit act of Congress pursuant to the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2006), by which Congress would announce its intent to preempt the regulatory power
of the states. Moreover, my proposal contemplates the absorption within the private market of residual
windstorm insurers such as Citizens Property Insurance Corporation in Florida and its counterparts in a
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remapping of all known or suspected floodplains. Once this is complete,
the task of mapping can be turned over to the insurance industry, which
can maintain and update this data dynamically (reflecting changing meteorological and development patterns). The NFIP would retain oversight responsibility to ensure that this function is performed accurately and timely.
This regulatory jurisdiction could profitably be shared with local insurance
commissioners, though they would be required to develop the actuarial expertise and resources necessary to play a meaningful role (i.e., something
beyond lobbying NFIP for local exemptions). Private insurers will have an
incentive to maintain accurate information because they will lose money to
the extent that they do not.
C. Rates and Subsidies
At the same time, the market must be given a freer hand in setting
rates. Perhaps the biggest impediment to the creation of a private insurance market is insurers' legitimate fear that, once in, they will be expected
to subsidize flood losses much as the NFIP does now. Already allergic to
regulatory rate setting, insurers' confidence in the process is not enhanced
when state governments allow their own residual pool premium increases
but deny them to private market participants.
Something approaching the market rate is absolutely essential to sigto
consumers that lakeshore views are expensive. It is debatable
nal
whether federal policy should be to facilitate high-risk development at all,
but that is a discussion left for another day. The assumption of this Article
is that governmental policy will continue to subsidize, even if implicitly, the
construction and maintenance of communities in places of high risk. The
question is how to enlighten that policy without fundamentally undermining it.
There are two categories of subsidies that my proposal requires, one of
which will likely be permanent. Eliminating the grandfathering provisions
overnight would cause a collapse in home values, as a home's price reflects
the implicit subsidy.13 6 The effect would be similar if, overnight, an additional million homes currently considered outside SFHA were
redesignated to reflect their true risk. The creators of the NFIP envisioned
a twenty-five year subsidy phaseout but provided no mechanism for
few other states. Finally, private windstorm coverage would return to its place within the standard
homeowners policy.
136. In an Ohio case, a couple purchased a home for $64,500, contingent upon securing a flood
insurance policy. Their insurance agent quoted an annual premium of $220. However, this rate was
inaccurate; the home's location in a high-risk area required a premium of $7000. Predictably, the insureds dropped their policy (note the absence of an effective mechanism to compel insurance) and
three years later suffered an uninsured flood loss. Had they been properly informed (and according to
the plaintiffs, had the local county commissioners properly implemented the flood mitigation controls
required for NFIP participation) either they would not have suffered a flood loss or they would have
declined to purchase the property in the first place. Carpenter v. Scherer-Mountain Ins. Agency, 733
N.E.2d 1196 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999).
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ensuring this. Recent amendments to the NFIP have purported to speed
up this process, but it is unclear if they will be effective.
My solution is to phase out all location-specific subsidies over a fifteen
year period. The declining subsidy must remain transferable to new purchasers to moderate the impact on housing prices. By that point, homeowners will be accustomed to paying near-market rates for flood insurance.
It is unlikely, however, that relatively poor homeowners will ever be
able to afford market rates for catastrophic coverage. It is appropriate to
redirect the impulse to subsidize toward consumers based on their income.
These subsidies may be effectuated in the form of tax credits (hateful as it
is to this author to countenance governance via the tax code).
Although imperfect from the standpoint of the free market ideal, the
redirected subsidy should unfold against a background of competitive, riskbased ratemaking. One of the great ironies of the NFIP is that it obscures
the fact that nearly everyone is at risk for flood-related losses. Flooding is
not limited to coastal or midwestern states. 137 Not only are there rivers
that occasionally overflow nearly everywhere, but homeowners in western
states are at risk for fire-induced mudslides and subsidence. 38 By substantially expanding the policy base, insurers can underwrite flood risk with
more manageable loss exceedance probabilities, making the business more
attractive. Although risk-based premiums imply substantial variation in
rates, a broad portfolio of relatively uncorrelated policies in force reduces
the risk of catastrophic loss to insurers.
D.

When All Else Fails

Just as it is unlikely that the government is going to abandon subsidies
for policyholders, it is unrealistic to expect an immediate re-allocation of
risk to the private market. There is, in fact, no inherent limitation on the
possible relationships between the private market and the government,
though in my view, private allocation should be a long-term goal of the
system. I suggest two ways in which the federal government can remain
involved in the underwriting of catastrophe risk.
First, the government could become a reinsurer of flood risk, roughly
analogous to the situation under the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act. Once
flood losses reached a certain "attachment point," the federal government
could pay a percentage of remaining losses. It turns out that there is no
shortage of options for such a structure, and I am hesitant to insist upon
one in particular. I would only suggest that the attachment point (say, $1
billion in flood losses) should be company-specific, relatively high, and that
the direct insurer remain responsible for some portion of the reinsured
losses (such as an 80/20 split). I believe it is crucial to keep insurers focused on their role as flood risk governance bodies.
137. King, supra note 7, at CRS-5.
138. Such claims are not clearly provided for even under a package of insurance policies, including
flood, homeowners, and sinkhole collapse. This gap should remind consumers that floods are not simply someone else's problem.
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Of course, insurers would be free to seek private reinsurance. One
mechanism that would have the combined virtues of privatization, flexibility, and expanded access to capital, yet still provide a federal role is the
catastrophe bond. A catastrophe bond is an event-linked obligation to pay
money. In a simple variation, the purchaser of the bond loans money at a
rate that varies by specified triggers (such as the declaration by the National Weather Service that a hurricane has formed; the wind speed record
at a monitoring station; or a numerical loss target). Until the event occurs,
the bond pays, say, 8% interest. Once triggered, the interest payments are
suspended, or the principal ceded to the borrower. The borrower here
would be an insurer, and the bondholders a virtual reinsurance consortium.
Catastrophe bonds are extremely attractive theoretically because they
dramatically lower the barriers to entering the insurance business by transforming physical risk into monetary risk-the kind of risk markets are very
good at processing. However, this market is immature, and the currently
high transaction costs have relegated "cat bonds" to a small corner of the
139
market.
My suggestion is that the U.S. Treasury create a market for such
bonds, gradually ceding control to private issuers as the market matures.
Even in these spendthrift times, a Treasury imprimatur is the most reliable
of measures and can be expected to significantly lower the cost of accessing
reinsurance capital. In this way, the reinsurance function can further market discipline, though it will be moderated (and enabled) by government
intervention.
Naturally, reinsurance alone (whether direct or distributed via securities) does not eliminate allocation disputes. However, it does channel
those disputes in two highly efficient ways not currently available. First,
direct insurers, private reinsurers and the federal government may opt to
pretermit allocation disputes via contract. For example, certain catastrophe bonds already have specific triggers that pay without regard to the actual damage sustained: The parties have mutually agreed that if the
triggering conditions are met, damage is sufficiently probable to occur that
the risk of non-occurrence (a hurricane that somehow skates over insured
properties, say) can be factored into the price of the bond more cheaply
than litigation can be pursued.
But even where litigation is necessary, the inclusion of flood insurance
effectively removes such disputes from the "retail" level of the policyholder
to the "wholesale" level of company-wide or regional losses. Determining
post-occurrence the relative contribution of covered and uncovered causes
is an expensive, epistemologically-fraught exercise. But estimating such

139. As the careful reader might well expect, Howard Kunreuther articulated the potential for
catastrophe bonds to expand natural disaster coverage several years ago. See David C. Croson & Howard C. Kunreuther, Customizing Reinsurance and Cat Bonds for Natural Hazard Risks, WHARTON FiNANCIAL INSTITUTIONS CENTER Paper 99-34 (1999).
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losses over a claims portfolio or geographical area is likely to be much
simpler.14 °
VIII.

CONCLUSION:

A

NATION OF POLICYHOLDERS

One of the virtues of a modest proposal such as this is inevitability.
Certainly, it is not inevitable that the federal-state compact on insurance
regulation should be breached; nor is it inevitable that private insurers
should be required to offer particular coverage. It is not inevitable that the
scope of the federal government should be expanded in this way, nor must
all homeowners tend unswervingly to the prudent course of full insurance
against the spectrum of risks they face.
What is inevitable is that our society will continue to assess premiums
opaquely through ad hoc post-disaster relief; that insurers will opaquely
remain in the flood insurance business to an extent they cannot transparently acknowledge; that communities will elect the benefits of development
now when the risks are to be borne elsewhere; and that the NFIP will be
reluctant to upset the constituencies of key members of Congress-for who
else would choose the focus on NFIP oversight, save for representatives
from coastal and alluvial plains? All these processes are inevitable unless a
considered decision to act is taken. At the end of the day, "when all else
fails, ' we are already a nation of policyholders. The only question is
whether we are to act as one.

140. In discussion with the author, one Louisiana judge facing a series of so-called "slab" cases (in
which there is nothing left but the foundation) wondered how he would possibly be able to explain
divergent results based largely on the same (absence of) evidence. My solution eliminates such
embarrassments.
141. The leading account of this dynamic is DAVID A. MOSS, WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS: GOVERNMENT AS THE ULTIMATE RISK MANAGER (Harvard University Press 2002), available at http://www.hup.
harvard.edu/pdf/MOSWHE-excerpt.pdf.

